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Abstract 
Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that 
incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this 
finding in terms of the ‘beneficial constraint’ arising from stronger employment protection in 
France, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activities 
in France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; and 
government fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduces the cost of its operation. 
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Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: 






Recent decades have witnessed the growing use of incentive systems that link pay to 
performance, at individual and at group level, in Britain, and even more so, in France. In this 
paper, we explore the influence of the institutional environment on employers’ adoption of 
different incentive pay systems. We draw on the now substantial literature in the New 
Economics of Personnel (NEP) and Human Resource Management (HRM) which broadly 
recommends that managers should match their incentive pay systems to the type of work 
system they operate as these affect their ability to monitor and manage employee 
performance. One limitation of these theories is that they seek to explain each organisation’s 
decision in relation to such internal factors. Yet, as we show in this paper, even after 
controlling for these work organisational influences, there remain large differences in the use 
of incentive pay schemes between firms in Britain and France. We seek to explain these by 
looking at how different institutional environments shape the implementation and adoption of 
incentive pay systems. 
 
It is common to think of the institutional environment in which firms make their HR decisions 
as an external constraint. For example, collective agreements which embody rate-for-the-job 
and pay-for-grade principles restrict management’s scope to reward individual performance. 
Indeed, the logic of the OECD’s Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPL), which 
covers both legal rules and collective agreements, is that although protection may benefit 
employees, it nevertheless restricts firms’ flexibility to adjust to changing conditions (OECD, 
2004). However, this is only part of the story. The institutional environment also provides 
resources which can make it easier and less risky for organisations to adopt innovative HR 
policies, and so widens the options open to firms. Levine and Tyson (1990) and Appelbaum 
and Batt (1994) argue that the weak institutional environment in the US delayed the 
introduction of innovative work practices. In similar vein, it has been argued that strong 
employer networks can favour development of transferable skills and innovative HR practices 
(Finegold 1991, Erickson and Jacoby, 2003), and that strong institutional coordination 
facilitated the spread of more flexible working practices in the Netherlands (Visser 1998), and 
the rise of diversified quality production in Germany (Streeck, 2004). In all of these cases, 
institutions have acted less as constraints, dictating a particular course of action, than by 
providing solutions to collective action problems that stood in the way of efficiency 
enhancing practices. 
 
The British and French workplace surveys, respectively, WERS (Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey) and REPONSE (Relations Professionnelles et Négociation d’Entreprise), 
enable us to explore these questions in much finer grain owing to their detailed information 
on work organisation and HR practices at establishment level. Their historical dimension, 
1990/92-2004, sheds valuable light on changes that led to the current position. Their 
                                                 
1 The authors thank the DARES of the French Ministry of Labour for funding this project and for access to
the REPONSE data, and the sponsors of WERS (Department for Business, Industry and Skills (BIS), the
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and
the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) and the ESRC Data Archive for access to the WERS data. We wish to thank Salima 
Benhamou for her research assistance at an earlier stage of this work, and which was published by DARES in 
Amossé et al. eds.  (2008) We also thank especially, Thomas Amossé, Loup Wolff, Alex Bryson, Bruce Rayton 
and two anonymous  referees for their generous advice and comments at various stages of this research. We also 
thank seminar colleagues at the CEP the LEST and the PiEP2 project, as well as Jérôme Gautié, Uschi Backes-
Gellner, Héloise Petit, Jean Saglio and Eric Verdier for helpful comments.  
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comparability of methods and definitions enables matching of many practices captured by the 
two surveys. We consider three main kinds of institutional influence on the use of incentive 
pay: the effect of employment protection on use of the dismissal threat, which we argue has 
been a stimulant for the use of all types of incentive pay as employers have to motivate those 
whom they cannot easily dismiss; peer support from employers’ local and national 
organisations, which has been especially relevant for developing more sophisticated incentive 
pay systems; and state encouragement of profit-sharing and employee share schemes by 
means of fiscal incentives.  
 
We focus on individual payment-by-results (IPBR) linked to measurable performance 
indicators, ‘merit pay’ increases based on supervisory appraisal, and profit-sharing and to a 
lesser degree share schemes, which concern savings rather than pay. We compare these with 
plants that do not use incentive pay (NIP: no-incentive-pay), which, we hypothesise make 
greater use of the threat of dismissal as an alternative performance incentive. Comparisons 
between the two countries could not be made for other types of incentive pay because of 
differences in question design. The analysis is restricted to private sector establishments with 
20 or more employees, the population covered by the 2004 REPONSE. We focus on non-
managerial employees as this is the category to which the work organisation variables most 
closely relate. 
 
We start by comparing incentive pay use in Britain and France. Then we outline the theories 
likely to explain the observed differences, notably, those from NEP and HRM and explore 
how the institutional environment relates to them. Next, we present the data and methods, 
followed by the regression results, and their interpretation. In conclusion, we argue for greater 
attention to the institutional environment as an influence on firms’ choice of incentive pay 
systems, and more widely of their HR strategies. 
 
 
2. Patterns of Incentive Pay Use in Britain and France 
 
Despite the stronger institutional regulation of pay and employment relations in France, 
compared with Britain, French establishments make considerably greater use of individual 
and collective forms of incentive pay. Table 1 presents an overview, focusing on our core set 
of incentive schemes, grouped in a number of different ways. Although the differences 
between the two countries are strong, they require careful interpretation because of the need 
to ensure comparable definitions of incentive pay schemes. Individual schemes in the two 
surveys comprise individual payment-by-results (IPBR) and ‘merit pay’ (for questions used, 
see Appendix Table 1). Individual PBR is defined in similar ways in both surveys: related to 
quantitative measures of physical and value output, such as piecework and sales commissions. 
 
‘Merit pay’ is an individualised pay increase or supplement based on a judgemental 
evaluation of employees’ individual performance by their line managers (Heneman and 
Werner 2005). It is the hardest scheme to measure because of variations in how well ‘merit’ is 
assessed in practice, and is complicated by a difference of terminology used in the two 
countries. WERS asks explicitly about ‘merit pay’ and shows a card defining it as ‘related to a 
subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or manager’. REPONSE 
asks about similar pay practices, but uses the term current among French employers and 
unions by referring to ‘individualisation’, or individualised pay increases, which it 
distinguishes from IPBR, general increases for all employees, and from collective bonuses.
2  
                                                 
2 In France, ‘merit pay’ has a negative connotation and is not widely used (Roussel, 2000). 
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To clarify, we distinguish three situations in which establishments might report the use of 
merit pay: 
 
(a) where performance appraisals are linked to individual pay awards; 
(b) where managers conduct separate evaluations for merit pay, often to prevent pay 
from distorting performance appraisal; 
(c) where managers make individual pay awards without any real evaluation. 
 
The spirit of Heneman and Werner’s review includes (a) and (b) but would exclude (c), and 
that is the definition adopted here. By combining the pay system questions in both surveys 
with other questions, we seek to align both countries with Heneman and Werner’s definition. 
Both surveys ask whether the establishment has a formal appraisal system for some or all 
their employees, and whether appraisal is linked to pay. Thus it is fairly easy to identify 
situation (a) for both countries. Distinguishing situations (b) and (c) is more delicate, but is 
necessary because 48% of British establishments reporting use of merit pay do not link it with 
their performance appraisal systems. The commonest cause of weak evaluation systems is that 
line-managers lack the skills and organisational support to conduct proper evaluations, which 
if done badly can be very conflictual. On the other hand, if the establishment has a 
performance appraisal system, and applies it to all its non-managerial employees, then, very 
likely, it has the necessary management support systems, and consequently the capability to 
conduct separate evaluations for pay purposes. Hence, we use this criterion to distinguish 
situation (b) from (c), which we exclude. In addition, REPONSE asks about the criteria used 
for awarding individualised increases, and we include only those that relate to individual 
performance. Thus, the definition we apply to France may be slightly more demanding than 
for Britain. Nevertheless, Table 1 shows that merit pay is much more widespread in France 
than in Britain: 42% compared with 13% of private establishments with 20 or more 
employees. It remains more widespread in France if we apply the over-restrictive definition 
(a) in which appraisal is linked to pay: 22% against 7%. Individual bonuses, IPBR, are also 
much more common in France: around 55% against 30%. Taking both types of individual 
incentive pay, French establishments stand out as much more intensive users at 69% 
compared with 37% for Britain. 
 
Collective incentives covered by the two surveys comprise team, group and establishment or 
enterprise bonuses, profit-sharing, and employee share ownership. They are recorded 
differently  between the two surveys, reflecting partly their tax treatment in the two countries. 
French governments have long encouraged ‘intéressement’, which is mostly profit-sharing, 
but may also include collective bonuses tied to specific productivity, quality or other 
collective performance targets. To qualify for tax advantages, ‘intéressement’ must apply 
equally to all employees, as must share schemes, the sums paid must be variable and set out in 
an establishment agreement (Cellier and Chaput, 2007). Profit-sharing benefited from similar 
tax incentives in Britain up to 2000, when they ceased for both new and existing schemes 
(HMRC, 2009). REPONSE does not provide information on collective bonuses separately 
from ‘intéressement’, whereas WERS does. Table 1 shows that, for non-managers, French 
establishments also use collective bonuses and profit-sharing more widely than in Britain: 
59% against 33%. Profit-sharing for non-managerial employees is practiced by 21% of British 
establishments, and intéressement, by 42% of those in France. The percentages are similar in 
both countries if we include managerial schemes, highlighting Britain’s relative concentration 
of profit sharing on managers. 
 
Although share schemes relate to savings rather than pay, as Bryson and Freeman (2008) 
point out, they have grown rapidly in Britain, encouraged by tax incentives, and provided an 4 
 
alternative to profit-sharing when its tax incentives were withdrawn.
3 In 2004, they were used 
by 20% of establishments for non-managers, and 25% including managers. This compares 
with about 10% of establishments in France. Nevertheless, if we consider profit-sharing and 
share schemes together as forms of financial participation, French firms remain more 
extensive users of these types of incentives for non-managers: 46% for France against 34% 
for Britain, although the British figure rises to 52% if managers’ schemes are also included. 
Profit-sharing and share schemes tend to be universal for all employees in France, but some 
are more occupationally specific in Britain, with a strong leaning towards managers. 
 
The fourth category concerns establishments without incentive pay for their non-managerial 
employees: ‘non-incentive pay’ (NIP) establishments. These represent about half in Britain 
(53% excluding share schemes and 47% including them), compared with 18% in France. This 
may slightly overstate the numbers without incentive pay, because neither survey provides 
information on pay rises linked to promotion which may also be considered as a form of 
incentive. 
 
France has used incentive pay more intensively than Britain for a number of years. REPONSE 
shows that IPBR was already widely used among French establishments in 1992, and that it 
increased only modestly up to 2004 (establishments with 50 or more employees – the size 
threshold in 1992). In contrast, in Britain, having spread from 1984 to 1990, from 25% to 
31% of private establishments, its incidence then fell back to 26% in 2004 (Pendleton et al. 
2008, Figure 2, establishments with 25 or more employees). Thus, Britain’s current lower rate 
of usage compared with France is not of recent origin. In both countries, use of IPBR declined 
in manufacturing and grew in financial and business services. Use of merit pay increased in 
both countries between 1990/92 and 2004, dramatically in France, but only modestly in 
Britain. In France, merit pay  increased from 25% of establishments in 1992, through 38% in 
1998 to 50% in 2004. This trend is corroborated by a number of other studies in France.
4 The 
growth has occurred across the manufacturing and service sectors. For Britain, because of 
definitional changes in WERS, we compare changes within the two WERS panels for 1990-
98 and 1998-2004. These indicate only a modest expansion in the use of merit pay.
5  The 
French have also been heavier users than the British of collective forms of incentive pay for 
non-managers, throughout the period, but the gap narrows when we include managers’ 
schemes, and share schemes. Looking across a longer time period, from 1984 to 2004, 
Pendleton et al. (2008) report that use of collective bonuses grew from 15% to 25%, and that 
of profit-sharing, from just under 20% to 44% - their figures include managers.
6  Bryson and 
                                                 
3 See HM Revenue and Customs: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/emp_share_schemes/menu.htm  
 
4 See: Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de l’Emploi (1988), Ministère du Travail (1992), Sandoval (1996) and 
(1997), and Barreau and Brochard (2003), Coutrot and Mabile (1993), and Coutrot.(1998). 
 
5 Because of the definitional changes and the lack of supplementary questions on appraisal for the whole period, 
the authors examined the WERS panels for 1990-98 and 1998-2004 separately. For 1990-98 we took the 
question on use of merit pay, but without the qualificatory questions on appraisal, and that showed usage rates of 
about 38-39% in both years. For 1998-2004, the variable pay question, which combined individual and collective 
forms, showed a progression from 24% to33%, but when combined with the question on use of individual 
performance measures, this fell to 15% and 17% respectively for 1998 and 2004. These results are on the same 
population of establishments as those of Table 1. 
 
6 Forthcoming, reported in Bryson and Freeman (2008: 2). The figures relate to private establishments with 25 or 
more employees, and include managers.  
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Freeman (2008) also report a strong growth in share schemes among British establishments in 
the years leading up to 2004, although apparently not as a result of quitting profit-sharing.
7 
 
Finally, Pendleton (2006) and Bryson and Freeman (2008) for Britain, and Brizard and Koubi 
(2007) for France, report evidence of growing use of multiple types of incentive pay within 
the same establishments, and that behind the overall trends, many establishments switch 
between different schemes. Brizard and Koubi observe increasing use of profit-sharing and 
merit pay in tandem. Pendleton proposes that managers may mix incentives to balance 
weaknesses of one with the strengths of another, and Bryson and Freeman find that some 
schemes, such as share schemes and profit-sharing may be mutually enhancing and lead to 
higher productivity when used in combination. Some figures for multiple use are shown in the 
bottom rows of Table 1. 
 
 
3. Factors Shaping the Choice of Incentive Pay Systems 
 
Comparing incentive pay patterns in Britain and France makes it possible to consider 
simultaneously the effects of both motivational or incentive factors and the institutional 
context. Here, we sketch out the main theories. NEP and HRM theories emphasise internal 
factors within organisations, notably, that incentive pay systems can contribute to 
organisational performance if they fit the work environment. In contrast, institutional theories 
stress collective action and the externalities associated with different types of incentives. We 
also consider the impact of market environment, a factor in theories of pay strategy, and 
establishment size and sector.  
 
The influence of work organization, technology and skills 
Work organisation, technology and skills shape the choice of incentives according to agency 
theory because they affect the ease or difficulty with which management monitors employee 
effort and performance (Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 1998). If skills are simple, and there are 
few information asymmetries between managers and their employees, then it is often possible 
to monitor the work process directly, to identify those who are ‘slacking’ and, if necessary, 
threaten dismissal. In more complex organisations, managers have more specialised roles, 
lack familiarity with many aspects of the work process, and face information asymmetries 
which make direct monitoring unreliable and inefficient. In these more complex 
environments, they face two broad options: whether to coordinate work by ‘standardisation’ 
or by ‘mutual adjustment’ (Mintzberg, 1979). 
 
Standardisation makes performance easier to plan and to monitor although it requires a 
predictable external environment. Taylorist patterns of work organisation have often focused 
on standardising individual work outputs. Individual jobs are designed for ease of work flow, 
monitoring, training inputs and rewards. Thus, by standardising and pacing work, the process 
technology provides much of the quality and effort monitoring needed. Depending on how 
much autonomy workers retain, a firm may additionally choose to adopt output-based 
incentives to sustain the work pace and penalise defects. For example, many firms pay their 
sales staff commissions to ensure that sales targets are reached. On the other side of the coin, 
withdrawal of effort through irregular attendance can be particularly disruptive in this kind of 
environment (Lanfranchi and Treble, 2008). Hence, it is often accompanied by close 
                                                 
7 The 98-04 panel shows that about 14% of establishment that switched into esops between 1998 and 2004 had 
done so by switching out of profit-sharing since 1998. The population referred to is that of private establishments 
with 20+ employees. It should be said that the sample numbers concerned are quite small. 
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monitoring of absence, and its output-based rewards supplemented with sanctions against 
absenteeism. 
 
Alternatively, firms may choose to standardise work roles. This is common in white collar 
environments where both effort and output are hard to measure in the short-run, often because 
of the informational complexity of the work and the judgement that employees are required to 
exercise. In such cases, if management focuses on what can be measured easily, it risks 
biasing performance towards those items (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). An alternative 
solution is to use subjective evaluations by line managers provided they are well-informed 
about their staff’s performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, Baron and Kreps 1999). This 
type of evaluation enables management to take greater account of many complex facets of 
work and its multiple objectives. These evaluations are often used to support ‘merit pay’. 
 
There are also many work environments in which line managers are not well-placed to 
evaluate employees’ performance in the short-run, for example, because of long-term 
outcomes, or employees’ expert knowledge. Such might be the case of a professional 
bureaucracy, for example, in health care and education. In such cases, a longer monitoring 
cycle may be appropriate, such as for promotion systems, although these are not covered by 
WERS and REPONSE. 
 
In organisational environments of greater uncertainty and informational complexity, 
coordination by mutual adjustment is often preferred because standardisation is inefficient in 
such conditions. Work roles need to adapt as new demands and new information emerge. In 
research and development, for example, those involved often have only an intuitive idea of 
what has to be achieved, and this is concretised as new information is discovered. It makes 
little sense to plan detailed work roles in advance, and it is more efficient to adopt broad job 
descriptions with flexible work allocation. The tightly codified job descriptions that facilitate 
individual monitoring are inappropriate in such conditions (McNabb and Whitfield, 2001). 
Hence, a more suitable form of organisation is that of flexible work teams, with rewards 
linked to group rather than individual performance. 
 
The risk of free-riding in team organisation increases with group size. Kandel and Lazear 
(1992) propose that peer monitoring can be efficient in such environments, and can be 
encouraged by means of group rewards. However, peer groups can also be dysfunctional: they 
may be discriminatory, and they may coalesce around vested interests. Thus, a potential 
solution is to supplement peer monitoring with individual appraisal by line managers. 
 
In recent years, with the spread of ‘high performance work systems’, there has been a 
considerable effort to promote greater use of mutual adjustment where in the past firms relied 
heavily on standardisation. This can be seen in increased use of quality circles, multi-skilling, 
job rotation, and use of teams (Ichniowski and Shaw 2003), all of which complicate the task 
of individual performance measurement, and especially for output-based pay. These 
developments, in conjunction with new technologies, such as greater use of computers, have 
raised the technical demands on employees, which place a premium on employee task 
discretion, at least for the categories affected, and hence require more judgemental approaches 
to performance evaluation (Gallie et al., 2004).  Conversely, simple output incentives often 
require a rather rigid pattern of work organisation in order to keep output monitoring simple, 
but the price is reduced adaptability to a changing environment (Kleiner, and Freeman, 1998). 
 
The contribution of this broad theoretical approach can be summarised in the decision tree 
sketched in Figure 1. It emphasises the close relationship between organisational decisions on 
work organisation and incentives, looking first at the complexity and information 7 
 
asymmetries of work process, then at the choice of coordination mechanism, the influence of 
this on the design of the key outputs, which in turn affects the appropriate type of 
measurement, and choice of incentive pay system. 
 
Human resource management systems and procedural aspects of incentive pay 
Whereas agency theory stresses the objective conditions for monitoring performance, HRM 
theories stress procedures and their fairness. Folger and Cropanzano (1998) argue that it is 
mistaken to think of performance appraisal as the subjective equivalent of objective 
performance measures, something they refer to as the ‘test metaphor’. A more suitable 
metaphor is that of a ‘trial’, in which matters of procedural justice play a critical part. 
Employees will only accept the outcome if they believe it has been reached by fair means. 
 
Their view is concordant with the main motivational theories of the HRM literature. 
According to expectancy theory, employees’ willingness to supply the required effort depends 
on their perception of a link between performance and reward (Lawler 1971, Ambrose and 
Kulik, 1999). This will be influenced by their perceptions of management’s fair dealing and 
its competence to measure their performance. If IPBR systems have long been popular with 
employees it is because, in addition to any match with the work system, they have made the 
link between performance and reward more visible and predictable. In contrast, merit pay 
needs checks and balances on managers’ fair dealing if it is to motivate effectively. 
 
Goal setting theory also stresses the importance of the quality of the objective setting and 
appraisal process highlighting the dialogue between management and workers in the 
establishment of work objectives (Locke and Latham 2002). Such dialogue can improve the 
information on which objectives are based and foster a greater sense of goal commitment 
among employees (Covaleski et al. 1998). Goal clarification can also benefit team working 
especially when individuals do not have standardised work roles. Thus, we expect good 
quality performance appraisal systems to be associated with the use of merit pay and to 
supplement collective incentives such as profit-sharing. On the other hand, they would be less 
in evidence in firms relying mainly on IPBR or on the dismissal threat. 
 
Business strategy and market conditions 
Firms may seek to align their pay systems with their wider business strategies (Gerhart and 
Rynes, 2003). These authors identify three types of fit: vertical, horizontal, and internal within 
pay strategy. Vertical alignment concerns the fit with product market strategies. This may 
occur if firms focus their competitive strategies on price or on quality. In the first case, 
seeking cost-minimisation practices, they would be expected to use either the dismissal threat 
or robust forms of IPBR, whereas in the latter, they would use more complex incentive 
systems to build employee involvement. Another aspect of competitive strategy concerns risk-
sharing with employees: often manifest in profit-sharing which makes pay more responsive to 
market fluctuations (Mabile, 1998). A high percentage of management respondents to 
REPONSE 2004 cited this as one of its benefits.
8 Horizontal alignment concerns the fit with 
other organisational practices, and overlaps largely with the theories already discussed. The 
third type of fit concerns how firms position themselves in their labour markets, for example, 
                                                 
8 This was indeed one of the advantages recognised by French HR directors when replying to Réponse. 79% of 
management respondents answered that profit-sharing (intéressement) enabled firms to increase their employees’ 
pay without commitment to future pay levels (Question 6.14). Respondents with profit-sharing agreements were 
more likely to agree strongly than those without (50% compared with 38%). As Mabile points out, despite a 
legal principle of non-substitution between basic pay and profit-shares in the French government schemes, in 
practice, there has been some substitution, and hence a potential increase in pay variability as a result of profit-
sharing, particularly in small firms (Mabile 1998). 
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by paying ‘efficiency wages’ above the market rate in order to elicit higher performance. This 
is sometimes presented as a way of making the dismissal threat more effective, because the 
dismissed employee has more to lose, and sometimes as a partial gift exchange, inducing 
reciprocal goodwill on the employee’s part (Akerlof, 1982). 
 
These monitoring, alignment and procedural justice considerations influence what Bryson and 
Freeman (2008) refer to as the ‘transaction’ or operational cost of incentive pay schemes. The 
economic significance of performance monitoring lies in its cost so that it weighs on firms’ 
business decisions. These include, from agency theory, costs of measuring performance and 
keeping records, to which one can also add the cost of HR policies designed to improve 
employees’ perceptions of fair treatment, and those of training managers, setting up appraisal 
procedures, due process, and so on. They affect incentive pay systems in different ways. Merit 
pay is probably the most expensive to operate, for a given amount of bonus, because of the 
need for procedural justice mechanisms, and to ensure managers have the training and 
resources to operate them effectively. The cost of IPBR often lies in setting up standardised 
work systems in which output can be measured quantitatively, although it often also involves 
due process because of disputes over measurement criteria and their application. Profit-
sharing, on the other hand, has rather low operational costs, although the designers of the 
early (1959) profit-sharing legislation in France found it was necessary to opt for audited 
profits because of conflicts between employers and unions (Camerlynk and Lyon-Caen, 
1977). In some respects, the dismissal threat might appear the least costly, although this may 
be affected by dismissal procedures. All of these elements focus on internal organisational 
factors.  
 
Externalities and the influence of collective action on diffusion 
Three types of external influence are particularly relevant to the differences in incentive pay 
patterns between Britain and France: employment protection, employer networking, and fiscal 
subsidies. Employment protection rules are based on legislation and encompassing collective 
agreements that affect all, or large numbers of firms in a given economy. This is the sense of 
the OECD’s EPL index. It places the British and French labour markets at opposite poles. 
Mostly, employment protection rules allow dismissals, but raise their cost to the employer, for 
example, by requiring notice periods, due process and financial compensation. This raises the 
cost of using the dismissal threat, and so encourages firms to invest in alternative motivators, 
such as incentive pay. In contrast, fiscal incentives, which are also available to all private 
employers, reduce the operational cost of the incentives to which they apply. Of the three 
externalities, the employer networking requires the most explanation. 
 
The actions of other firms impinge upon an individual firm’s choice of incentive pay in a 
number of ways, particularly for independent, or single, establishments, and smaller sized 
firms. The decisions on pay levels by other firms have an obvious impact because they are 
labour market competitors. Mobility may also affect the working of HR practices. As workers 
move between firms, they take their expectations of how management operates with them. 
The same is true of managers. Thus, if they are familiar with low-trust relations from their 
previous employment, they are likely to be cynical about promises made by their new 
employers. Individual firms can break out of this cycle, but they have to invest in the 
employee selection and training required for a more high trust work environment. Levine and 
Tyson (1990) argue that rival employers can undermine these efforts when they target such 
workers for poaching. Likewise, if managers see their own job markets as comprising low-
trust firms, they may orient their performance towards short-term goals in order to boost their 
external career prospects (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994). On the other hand, if there is a critical 
mass of employers who want to innovate, then there is scope for sharing knowledge and 
experience in the development of new types of HR systems and new pay practices. The 9 
 
effectiveness of learning by doing depends on the range of unusual problems encountered 
(Koike and Inoki, 1990). When firms pool their diverse experiences with new pay systems, 
they learn from a wide variety of different problems encountered across a range of 
organisations, and they can incorporate these into improved design and operation. The 
willingness to engage in such activities is enhanced by the existence of suitable employer 
networks (Erickson and Jacoby, 2003). 
 
Although managers can easily get ‘off-the-peg’ information about pay systems, they do not 
usually know in advance which best fit the conditions of their own organisation. The WERS 
and REPONSE panels indicate that many establishments switch incentive pay systems, 
suggesting a good deal of experimentation. Indeed, Belfield and Marsden (2003) found that 
switching was more common when there was a poor fit between pay system and work 
environment. Firms can also hire consultants, but as Cole (1989 and 1998) argued, conflicts 
of interest between consultants and their clients can reduce the effectiveness of the learning 
process compared with using network relations with peer organisations – the collective action 
solution. Firms might use local employer organisations and human resource manager clubs, 
for example, as a basis for such network activities, as discussed later on.
9 We anticipate that 
such externalities will be greatest for independent establishments that are not able to draw on 
the resources of a larger organisation. 
 
Such negative and positive externalities arising from the actions of other employers affect, in 
different ways, each of the four types of incentive system: IPBR, merit pay, profit-sharing, 
and the dismissal threat. In general, the impact is greater, the higher the initial investments 
and operating costs. In many respects, they are least for the dismissal threat, arguably the 
most robust, albeit the most negative, of the incentive systems considered here. In the NEP 
literature, it is presented as one of the commonest alternatives to positive incentives (Belman 
et al, 1992). If a firm’s employees are easily replaced, and its investment in their human 
capital small, then it might consider that the dismissal threat will motivate its employees more 
cheaply than incentive payments. It is robust because it cannot be undercut by competing 
employers, although in the long-run it may well inhibit firms from investing in their workers’ 
skills. It is an option that is more readily available to employers in labour markets where 
employment protection rules are weak. 
 
Individual PBR systems are also fairly robust because they focus on objective performance 
measures which are easy to observe, and in many sectors, both managers and workers have 
long been familiar with their operation - they are ‘tried and tested’. On the other hand, in 
sectors where their use is new, their operation can be problematic because of lack of 
experience on both sides. Since the early 1990s, in both countries, the decline in IPBR in 
manufacturing has been offset by growth in private services, and especially in financial and 
business services, arguably where there is less experience of their operation
10. Thus, recent 
examples in these sectors illustrate the risks of poorly designed IPBR such as the miss-selling 
pensions and insurance policies, and excessive risk-taking.
11  As Pendleton (2006) argued, 
some firms have supplemented IPBR with collective schemes in order to moderate 
                                                 
9 I am grateful to Eric Verdier for explaining to me how these have worked in the French environment. This view 
is based on his extensive fieldwork contacts with local and national employers there. 
 
10 Evidence for Britain back to 1984 can be found in Bryson et al (2008). Evidence from the REPONSE panel 
shows overall stability in the use of IPBR by French establishments, a modest decline in manufacturing being 
compensated by growth in financial services and in distribution. 
 
11 See for example, ‘City watchdog to focus on bankers’ bonuses’, Financial Times, 20.5.08.  
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excessively individualistic rewards. Thus as with merit pay, there is scope within IPBR for the 
learning and knowledge sharing processes mentioned earlier, especially in the sectors where 
its operation has grown in recent years. 
 
Merit pay depends heavily upon employee confidence in an evaluation process they cannot 
observe directly. The perceived unfairness of many of the early merit pay schemes in France 
bears this out (Eustache 1986). In their new form, there was a greater need to learn how to 
operate such schemes in practice, to improve their design, and to blend them with existing 
practices, such as pay negotiations. As stressed earlier, the investments required for merit pay 
are greater than for the other types of incentive pay systems considered here. They give rise to 
externalities of two kinds: the gains from joint learning, and potential losses from poaching 
because of the human resource investments required to make these policies more effective. 
 
Profit-sharing, at first sight, might seem easy to apply, and free from most obvious 
externalities. However, potential free-rider issues need to be avoided. It may be for such 
reasons that many employers, especially in France, have sought in recent years to supplement 
profit-sharing with appraisal and merit pay, as observed by Brizard and Koubi (2007). Peer 
pressures are likely to be less effective the larger the group. Similar observations apply to 
share schemes. Therefore, there is scope also for multi-employer activities to improve their 
design and operation, albeit to a lesser degree than for merit pay. It is likely too that the 
presence of fiscal subsidies will exert a significant influence by reducing operating costs. 
 
Faced with the considerable outlay for an outcome that is uncertain, many firms may prefer to 
use the dismissal threat, especially if it is readily available because of permissive employment 
protection rules. Thus one can easily envisage the development of a low-incentive 
equilibrium, analogous to the low-skill equilibrium of Finegold and Soskice (1988). Major 
interdependencies between the decisions of individual firms penalise lone innovators, and 
therefore require some form of collective action for their solution. In this context, the 
existence of restrictive employment protection rules could provide the push necessary to 
cause large numbers of firms to consider substituting positive for negative performance 
incentives. 
 
The strength of formal employment relations institutions has an ambiguous role with regard to 
incentive pay. Historically, union representation has built on the concept of the common rule 
that applies to all employees in a particular category (Webb and Webb 1902). Applied to pay 
systems, it has often translated into rate-for-the-job and pay-for-grade principles. Such rules 
underpin effective union action because it is easier to mobilise members around a common 
goal (Traxler, 1995), and because employees can more easily monitor the application of clear 
and simple pay rules. Because merit pay blurs the perceived link between effort and reward, 
one would expect strong workplace unions to oppose it, at least initially, and to insist that if 
incentive pay is to be used, it should follow clear and predetermined rules (Barkume, 2004)
12. 
 
On the other hand, a desire to increase procedural justice may cause managers to seek ways of 
‘tying their own hands’. To allay suspicions that they will abuse their discretion in awarding 
merit pay, they can use existing representation channels in new ways: to discuss or agree the 
overall amount of money and criteria for its distribution with local employee representatives. 
In France, 50% of private establishments held negotiations or discussions on pay in 2004, and 
                                                 
12  Barkume (2004) found that in a sample of US plants, union presence tended to be associated with pay 
supplements calculated according to fixed rules related to the type of work, and that IPBR was more common in 
non-union plants. On the other hand, Gregg and Machin (1988) found that union presence of itself did not inhibit 
use of certain forms of contingent pay, although presence of strong unions did. 
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of those with merit pay, 47% negotiated over the kitty, and 39% the criteria to be applied. In 
Britain, many fewer private establishments have this resource (just over 20% of plants in our 
sample were covered by pay agreements)
13. National and sectoral employer organisations can 
assist such processes by facilitating change at lower levels. For example, in order to 
encourage local pay developments, national employer organisations may have to press for 
below-inflation increases at national level, to leave more headroom for local negotiation 
(Schager, 1993). 
 
Finally, the density of the web of employment relations institutions can reinforce local 
employer networking. In appearance, networking is a fragile process, both to promote joint 
learning and to restrain poaching. When considered in isolation, networks have  limited 
sanctions against deviant members. However, if they are embedded in a number of other 
employment relations activities, such as involvement in employer associations, sectoral 
bargaining, and dealing with the same unions as other local firms, then we are in a situation 
that Aoki (2001, Ch. 2) describes as ‘linked games’. These are very important for the 
development of cooperation because when an employer behaves disloyally in one ‘game’, its 
fellows can reduce or withdraw their cooperation across a range of other linked activities. 
Thus, although employer network activities are present in both countries, one might expect 
them to be more effective when embedded in a stronger web of employment relations 
activities, and hence for their impact on incentive pay choice to be greater in France than in 
Britain. 
 
Our key expectations concerning the influence of these factors on establishments’ choice of 
incentive pay systems are summarised in Table 2. 
 
 
4. Data and Statistical Method 
 
Description of key survey variables 
How the main influences on incentive choice shown in the decision chart in Figure 1 translate 
into the survey questions is shown in Table 2, together with the expected signs attaching to 
each. More detail on the questions is given in Appendix Table 2. Thus, complex work 
environments, characterised by information asymmetries between workers and their 
managers, can be identified by a high training intensity, high use of computers, high 
percentages of management and professional, and of technical staff, and use of formal 
qualifications instead of on-the-job training. Simple skill environments can be identified by 
the inverse of these. 
 
Coordination by mutual adjustment is signalled by use of teams, and small group activities 
which involve continuous adaptation to changing work demands. Coordination by 
standardisation is signalled by extensive use of business targets and absence monitoring, 
TQM, and high levels of administrative staff to manage these systems. Both types of 
organisation require investments in coordination routines which must be learned by 
employees so that other categories of staff are needed as employment buffers to provide 
flexibility against variations in demand. Agency personnel are one such category, but their 
use is expensive owing to agency fees, so they are used when there is a need for predictability 
over supply and quality. In contrast, organisations that coordinate by direct control, can invest 
less in their human resources so that numerical flexibility can be spread across all their 
                                                 
13 22%, based on the variable used in Appendix Table 3 (fcover) taking the percentage of establishments in 
which no employees had they pay determined by collective bargaining.  
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employees. They are more likely to use a second type of buffer: general fixed-term 
employees, who do not incur agency fees. A high percentage of these would denote low 
investments in firm-specific skills and low attachment between the firm and its employees, 
and hence scope for the dismissal threat. However, many new hires are also offered 
probationary fixed-term contracts, especially in France (INSEE 2008), and their presence 
could reflect employment growth. Therefore, we interact the percentage of fixed-term 
employees with the absence of employment growth, ‘fixed-term-no-growth’, which we expect 
to be positively related to low attachment and use of the dismissal threat. A second indicator 
of use of secondary labour market workers with low dismissal costs is the percentage of 
women workers. This is not ideal, but as shown by a detailed study of British and French 
labour markets, women workers in both countries, but especially in Britain, continue to be 
concentrated in secondary labour markets (Valette 2007, Ch 4). 
 
Job discretion is one of the key mediating factors in both incentive and motivation theory. 
This is captured by the questions on job autonomy and managerial control in both surveys, 
and was the measure used by Brown and Heywood (2005). However, the two surveys have 
adopted different  approaches: WERS measures the influence workers have over how they 
organise, and pace their work, whereas REPONSE measures their independence from 
management intervention. These two approaches may reflect a difference in managerial 
hierarchies in the two countries, notably with more tightly structured hierarchies in France 
(Maurice et al. 1980, Gallie 1983). In many circumstances, they give similar results. Both 
correlate positively  with the measures of occupational level, training intensity, computer use, 
and sector, variables that Green (2008) found were correlated with job discretion. 
Nevertheless, they could diverge in certain types of work environment: in standardised 
environments the same narrowly defined jobs might benefit from high task discretion within 
the job combined with frequent management intervention because skills involved are narrow. 
Likewise, under direct control, the same low-skilled job might have low autonomy, but 
require infrequent management intervention because of its routine nature. Thus, IPBR could 
be associated with opposite scores of job autonomy, high in Britain and low in France, and the 
opposite way round for NIP. In the pooled regression, we use a country interaction to capture 
these contrasting definitions. 
 
Use of performance appraisal has a dual significance. It can be a performance monitoring 
practice used when objective measures are inappropriate (Baron and Kreps, 1999: Ch 10), and 
so may indicate the complexity of individual work performance. It can also provide 
procedural justice (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998: Ch 5). For both reasons, we expect 
appraisal to correlate negatively with NIP and IPBR, and positively with merit pay and profit-
sharing. It may also be used to counter potential free-rider effects under group incentives. 
However, use of this measure for merit pay is problematic because it is used in our definition. 
We therefore omit appraisal from the merit pay regressions in the main tables. Institutional 
resources that could underpin either pay-for-grade rules or procedural justice mechanisms are 
well-covered by both surveys but in ways that reflect the different institutional arrangements 
in both countries. Our chosen indicator of workplace union strength, which could pressurise 
employers to keep to pay-for-grade systems, was the presence of a workplace trade union 
employee representative. As the focus of this study is on incentive pay, we are concerned 
about the influence of collective agreements on its use. In Britain, coverage of the workplace 
by a collective agreement would normally capture this. In France, we used whether the 
establishment followed bonus rates in the relevant industry pay agreement.
14 
                                                 
14 In 56% of cases they did; in 11% they did not even though bonus rates were covered by the agreement – 
French employers are at liberty to pay above the industry agreement rates; and in 26% the industry agreement 




Another key institutional resource concerns employer networking at local level. This can be 
measured partially by involvement in local and regional employer association activities, and 
other local employer bodies such as chambers of industry and commerce. REPONSE 
specifies an additional category, not used in WERS, on involvement in ‘clubs’ of HR 
directors and entrepreneurs. We were not able to replicate for both countries the measure of 
networking used by Erickson and Jacoby (2003) by counting the number of activities in which 
firms were involved. However, from our consideration of externalities, networking should be 
particularly valuable for independent establishments which often lack the internal resources to 
develop fully their own HR practices. Thus, we interact involvement in local employer 
activities with being an independent establishment. By the same argument, large 
establishments, and those in multi-unit organisations, are likely to benefit from internal 
resources, and so have less to gain from networking. 
 
Local employer networking can benefit from being embedded in a strong employment 
relations milieu. National employer organisations can help them get started and provide 
frameworks for developing local pay strategies. Local bargaining itself may stimulate 
employer networks as they deal with the same unions at local level. This can be seen from the 
two surveys: establishments engaged in local activities are more often members of national 
associations in France, than in Britain (71% to 50%). They more often have a workplace 
union rep (44% to 9%), and more often have a collective agreement on bonuses or a local 
agreement on pay (70% and 22%). Thus, although networking has a special role to play in the 
development of organisational capacities to run complex incentive pay systems, it derives 
strength from the web of employment relations activities in which establishments are 
involved. Therefore, when analysing the different rates of incentive pay adoption in the two 
countries, we look closely at networking in relation to this whole bundle of variables. 
 
In contrast to firms with sophisticated incentive pay systems, those using NIP may often 
affiliate to national employer associations in order to be covered by sectoral agreements on 
industry pay minima, and thus ‘out-source’ pay-setting, and economise on their HR 
expenditures. We therefore restrict the variable on membership of a national employers’ body 
to establishments that are involved at that level only. 
 
Workplace climate, according to a number of studies, is a factor in the success of incentive 
pay schemes (eg. Drago and Heywood, 1995), and is therefore likely to favour their adoption, 
especially the higher transaction cost schemes such as merit pay. It is measured directly in 
both surveys by asking management and employee representatives. Although the replies of 
managers and employee reps correlate moderately well, the sample numbers for reps are 
significantly smaller, so we stick with the management perceptions.
15  
 
Market strategy (which has been stressed as a factor in shaping organisations’ pay strategies) 
(eg. Gerhart and Rynes, 2003), is partially captured by whether or not the establishment 
competes on price or on quality. Two other factors associated with the pay strategy literature 
are whether the firm seeks to pay above the ‘market rate’ in order to attract better employees 
and to reinforce motivation, which we capture by whether establishment average pay is above 
the mean for its industry, and its ability to pay, which we capture by the management 
respondent’s estimate of their firm’s financial performance relative to their main competitors. 
 
                                                 
15 It is possible also to look at individual employee perceptions. However, only a minority of establishments have 
sufficient employee respondents to compute a reliable measure for the establishment as a whole. 
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Economic sector serves partly as a conventional control variable, but it also captures other 
influences. In France, unlike in Britain, it remains an influence on sectoral pay bargaining, as 
on, job classifications, and some bonuses. There are also well-known sectoral work patterns, 
such as the use of sales commissions in Distribution and part of Financial Services, of 
bonuses in Construction for on-time completion of building projects, and use of pay-for-grade 
systems in professional bureaucracies such as in Health and Education. 
 
For the two-country comparison, in many cases, we were able to match single questions. 
Where several questions appeared to focus on closely related practices or measures, we 
combined them to form an index, and checked its internal consistency using factor analysis 
and Cronbach’s alpha.
16 All our variables are scaled to values between zero and unity to 
facilitate comparisons. Where possible, we retained continuous scales to avoid loss of 
information, but where the match of questions was less robust, or they were of a simple 
‘yes/no’ kind, we opted for binary measures (see Appendix Table 3). 
 
Finally, for the effects of employment protection and fiscal subsidies, which apply to all 
private establishments in an economy, we mobilise the country dummy in the pooled 
regressions, using the other variables as indicators of the paths through which these factors 
influence incentive choice. The OECD’s EPL index shows that British workers are 
considerably less protected than their French counterparts so that their employers are 
correspondingly less constrained by legal and collective agreement rules over dismissals, a 
fact reinforced by the relative decline of union strength in Britain since the 1980s 
(Blanchflower et al. 2006, and Amossé 2006). In fact, French employment law provides 
streamlined dismissal and consultation procedures for small firms with less than 50 
employees, and this size threshold will be used later to test for the effect of EPL. Lesser 
protection is also reflected in the greater proportion of unstable and secondary labour market 
jobs, from which dismissal is easier, in Britain compared with France (Valette, 2007), 
indicators of which we shall also use in our establishment level analysis. Valette shows that in 
Britain these cover about 50% of British workers compared with 30% in France. Thus, the 
labour market environment in Britain means that the dismissal threat is a more readily 
available option to enforce work discipline than in France. 
 
Characteristics of the sample establishments in the two countries 
Despite broad similarities between establishments in the two countries, there are some notable 
differences between the two economies which could contribute to the overall patterns of 
incentive use (Appendix Table 3). More British establishments use teams: nearly three-
quarters of British private establishments use teamwork for the majority of their employees, 
as against about a fifth in France. They also score more highly for job autonomy: 0.68 against 
0.35 in France, with values ranging between zero and one. In contrast, French establishments 
more often use small group activities (0.64 compared with 0.52). Thus a first impression is 
that British establishments provide more job autonomy and teamwork, and French ones, more 
management-led small group activities. 
 
Appraisal for all employees is widespread in both countries, but more so in Britain, as is the 
monitoring of absence. French establishments make more use of business targets, quality 
                                                 
16 For example, our measure of small group activities combined questions on the presence of quality circles and 
workshop meetings. Each was binary, so we added their respective scores and divided by two. We used factor 
analysis and Cronbach’s alpha to see how far the questions loaded onto a single factor. We also checked across 
our key work organisation measures to ensure they were distinct. Thus, although team working, might seem 
related to job autonomy measures, in practice it loaded onto a separate factor, and alpha score was low, so use 
treated teams and autonomy as separate independent variables. 
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standards, and agency personnel, which are often used in conjunction with just-in-time. They 
compete more on quality and less on price. French establishments employ more technicians, 
and British ones, more administrative and sales staff. This suggests a somewhat different 
management focus: France having a greater emphasis on technical issues, tight management 
control, clarity of plant objectives. French establishments are generally more heavily engaged 
in collective activities with a stronger web of collective employment relations. 
 
Estimation model 
For practical reasons, we chose a simple additive model for estimating the probability that an 
establishment will use a particular type of incentive pay.  
 
Incentive Choice = a + b(country) + c(information asymmetries/ skill complexity) + 
d(type of coordination) + e(work discretion) + f(institutional resources) + g(controls) 
+ error term 
 
Institutional resources cover the web of employment relations institutions, employer 
networking, and government incentives. The controls included measures of product market 
strategy, establishment size, and sector of activity. We explore the effect of these variables on 
incentive use in the two countries individually (see Appendix Table 4), and by pooling the 
data using a country dummy variable (Table 3).  
 
To interpret the country coefficient we need to consider three different types of effect. First of 
all, it captures the influence of factors that bear on establishments in one country but not in 
the other. Thus if tax incentives for profit sharing apply in one country but not in the other, 
and they are effective, one would expect to see a positive sign on the dummy for the country 
concerned. On the other hand, the dummy variable would not reflect the influence of factors 
represented by other variables included in the equation. Thus if firms use profit-sharing in 
order to support team working and small group activities, we would expect this effect to be 
picked up by these variables and not by the country dummy. One of the drawbacks with 
country dummies is that they may embody the impact of all the unmeasured country-specific 
influences on choice of pay system. A third effect that can help to resolve this problem relates 
to the use of appropriate interactions. For example, to assess the impact of EPL, we shall use 
the size threshold at which employers’ obligations over dismissals become more onerous. In 
same vein, interactions can be used to deal with another problem, namely that the same 
variables might have different effects in either country.  The pooled analysis assumes that the 
underlying influence of each variable on incentive adoption is the same in both countries. 
This is reasonable on theoretical grounds for many of the variables reflecting processes dealt 
with by NEP or HRM theories, and for some of the control variables such as size and sector. 
However, interactions can be expected for some of the institutional variables, such as 
networking, where their effect may vary according to the surrounding employment 
institutions. This is explored in the results section (see Table 4 below). 
 
We make two key simplifications in our model. First, we leave aside the analysis of ‘bundles’ 
of practices, despite the important work on this subject (eg. Godard, 2004). Differences in the 
way some questions were posed, reflecting in part major differences in the institutional 
arrangements and common managerial practices in the two countries of the kind discussed 
earlier, meant that the data were too coarse-grained to progress far in this direction
17. 
Secondly, we treat managers as choosing between the items on the ‘menu’ independently of 
                                                 
17  Some interactions were tested, for example between job autonomy and the variables used to identify 
coordination type, but none proved significant either in the pooled or in the individual country analysis. 
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each other. Although there are theoretical arguments for modelling the choice as 
interdependent (Rayton, 2006), and some evidence from the two surveys
18, in practice, we 
found that this meant deriving a set of mutually exclusive options, such as merit pay only, 
merit pay with profit-sharing, and profit-sharing only, with the result that many options on the 
‘menu’ were chosen by only small numbers of establishments, so that the estimated 
coefficients proved erratic. Combining the types of incentive systems into larger categories, 
such as individual and collective, eases the statistical problem but at the price of obscuring the 
distinction between well-established pay systems recorded by the two surveys. 
 
 
5. Regression Results 
 
For each type of incentive pay system we ran both pooled two-country and single-country 
regressions.
19 Because some British establishments may have substituted share schemes for 
profit-sharing, we include also results for share schemes even though they are not strictly 
incentive pay. We present first the more synthetic view given by the pooled analysis first, and 
then look at exceptions arising from the individual country regressions. To simplify reading, 
the logit coefficients are shown as marginal effects which can be read as showing how a 
proportionate change in the variable concerned affects the probability that a particular type of 
incentive pay will be used.
20 For binary variables, it shows the effect of a change from zero to 
unity (see Appendix Table 3). Although the most important findings of this paper relate to the 
institutional influences on incentive choice, following the logic of the earlier discussion, we 
start with the factors associated with the NEP and HR theories which provide the background 
against which to interpret collective action. 
 
Impact of factors related to incentive theory 
Firms in both countries appear to be influenced by many of the factors highlighted by the 
NEP and HR theories when adopting incentive pay systems, as can be seen by comparing the 
anticipated outcomes of Table 2 with the pooled regressions of Table 3. Nevertheless, some 
caution is needed because several relationships have the expected sign, but are not statistically 
significant. Where information asymmetries and skill complexity are low, managers are more 
likely to use NIP, and where these factors are high, they are more likely to use merit pay. The 
marginal effects show that, for example, a 10% increase in computer use is associated with a 
1.25% reduced probability of NIP, and a 1.75% increased probability of merit pay. IPBR lies 
in-between. For profit and share schemes, it appears that current or recent fiscal incentives, 
which reduce the firm’s net cost of operating them, have muted the effect of work 
organisational factors as most of them are not significant. 
 
                                                 
18 There are signs of complementarity between some of the incentive pay systems, as indicated by including the 
three incentive pay systems (IPBR, MP and profit-sharing) on the right hand side in each other’s regressions, and 
by a Poisson regression run on the number of schemes in operation in the same establishment. In both cases, we 
used the regression model of Table 3. IPBR and profit-sharing were positive and significant at 1% when 
regressed on merit pay, as was merit pay at 1% when regressed on IPBR, and positive but significant only at 
12% when regressed on profit-sharing. Significantly for our analysis, engagement in local activities by 
independent establishments was positive and significant for both IPBR and merit pay, and also for the number of 
incentive schemes used, in the Poisson regression (Appendix Table 5).  Thus, it proved robust to both types of 
analysis. 
 
19 For the pooled analysis, the combined sample was reweighted to adjust for the different sample numbers for 
Britain and France. 
 
20 These were calculated using STATA’s standard mfx command for logit postestimation (dy/dx).  
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Turning to the forms of coordination, mutual adjustment, as signalled by teams, small group 
activities and use of a core workforce (agency) broadly favour merit pay compared with NIP. 
Standardisation clearly favours IPBR, and disfavours non-incentive use, and as anticipated, it 
seems neither to favour nor disfavour the more sophisticated types of incentive pay. For 
example, applying TQM, a binary variable, reduces the probability of NIP by 6%, but 
increases that of IPBR by 7% and that of merit pay by 6%.
21 Coordination by direct control, 
as signalled by use of secondary labour market groups (women and non-probationary fixed-
term) favours NIP and disfavours use of incentive pay. 
 
Employee job discretion has the expected effect on the use of IPBR and NIP once allowance 
is made for the definitional differences explained earlier, by means using an interaction. Thus 
IPBR is positively associated with high job autonomy in Britain, as incentive theory would 
predict, and in France, with high management control because of the associated monitoring 
system. Conversely, NIP is associated with limited job autonomy in Britain, and infrequent 
management intervention in France. 
 
On procedural justice, as anticipated, appraisals are negatively related to NIP, weakly positive 
with IPBR, and strongly so with profit and schemes. For merit pay, we ran the regression on 
the broadest definition of merit pay, which made no reference to appraisal, and included all 
the appraisal measures, which were positive and significant. A good employment relations 
climate, a potential indicator of workplace trust, even if the view expressed is by 
management, is positively associated with merit pay and profit-sharing, negatively with NIP, 
and non-significantly with IPBR whose objective performance measures rely less on trust 
than do the subjective measures used for merit pay. 
 
The pay and market strategy factors, relative pay and ability to pay and competition price or 
quality, did not come through with strong statistical significance, except that NIP 
establishments are likely to have below average pay and financial performance. More 
surprising is that merit pay should be associated with below average pay given the expectation 
that employers might choose to make paying above the market conditional on performance. 
On the other hand, it was to be expected that share schemes would accompany above average 
financial performance, as a way of sharing good and bad times with employees. 
 
Among the controls, the positive effect of establishment size on the use of profit and share 
schemes has been observed elsewhere by Pendleton (2006), who explains it in terms of the 
need to develop a common interest among employees across all the establishments of an 
enterprise. We return to the issue of merit pay when discussing networks. Notable sectoral 
effects include the widespread use of IPBR and merit pay in finance and business services in 
both countries, and the absence of incentive pay of any form in private education, health and 
personal services. In education and health, it is likely that this reflects the use of pay for grade 
systems combined with promotion opportunities which provide a form of long-term 
performance incentive of the kind described in Chart 1. In private personal services, the story 
may be rather different in view of the lesser importance of professional qualifications than in 
education and health. 
 
Impact of institutional factors 
Employment protection and the strength of the dismissal threat depend largely on the 
organisation of the labour markets in which establishments operate. This is reflected in the 
country coefficient (marginal effect: -0.68) which shows that French establishments are 
                                                 
21 . The marginal effects for a binary variable are calculated in terms of a shift from 0 to 1, or a 100% change. 
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roughly two-thirds less likely to use NIP than British ones, which is consistent with the 
frequencies shown in Table 1. On the other hand, it shows that the variables considered below 
do not greatly reduce the size of the country effect. Nevertheless, they shed light on the 
intervening processes through which employment protection may affect choice of NIP. 
 
Many firms operating NIP are geared up to take advantage of the prevailing labour market 
regime. This can be seen in the employment of ‘secondary labour market’ categories of 
workers, in this case women and temporary workers, as in terms of other indicators of low 
investment in worker skills and organisational practices in both the individual country and the 
pooled regressions. The percentage of women workers is positively associated with use of 
NIP and negatively with several of the incentive pay systems. The same is true of use of non-
probationary fixed-term employees. It is also of note that the British establishments employ 
more women workers than the French ones (45% compared with 38%). The regressions also 
show that NIP establishments are less likely to use highly skilled labour and computers, and 
they invest less in expensive procedural justice mechanisms such as appraisals, and are less 
active in local employer networks. They also compete more often on price than on quality. 
Thus, although we cannot give a precise figure, it is very likely that the greater use of NIP in 
Britain can be explained largely by the presence of a more permissive environment for use of 
the dismissal threat than in France, coupled with the way that more British establishments use 
employment patterns that enable them to take advantage of it. 
 
It was suggested earlier that employment protection could cause French establishments to use 
merit pay more often than British ones. One test of this is to use the size threshold at which 
employment law protections become more onerous, and interact it with the France dummy. 
The results are shown in Table 4. To test whether the 50 employee threshold of the law was 
the relevant one in the data, we experimented with 40 and 100 employees. As can be seen, the 
sharpest effect came at 50 employees, showing that French firms on average were 26% more 
likely to use merit pay than their British counterparts, whereas those with less than 50 
employees were only 15% more likely to do so (0.26-0.11).  
 
Associational resources and employer network activities play a key role in the use of 
incentive pay systems, and for this reason, as will be seen, the country coefficient on merit 
pay, already lower than for NIP and profit-sharing, further declines when we include 
interactions between associational activities and country (Table 4). One of the key arguments 
is that these activities help to discourage poaching, and support the joint learning needed to 
underpin the investments for high transaction cost incentive systems, notably merit pay. A 
key indicator of this is the involvement of the establishment’s management in local employer 
activities such as those local employer bodies and HR and entrepreneur clubs. 
 
As argued earlier, employer networking is likely to be of greatest value to managers in 
independent establishments, and therefore, to be signalled by a positive interaction between 
involvement in local activities and independence, especially for merit pay, but to a lesser 
extent also for some of the other forms of incentive pay. Being a networking independent 
establishment reduces the probability of NIP by 8%, and increases that of having IPBR by 
11% and of merit pay by 13% (Table 3). There is no significant relationship for profit or share 
schemes. Reinforcing this line of argument is that establishments which have the option of 
drawing on internal HR expertise from elsewhere in the same multi-plant company, or from 
within a large establishment which has its own in-house HR resources are also more likely to 
adopt high transaction cost incentives. In our sample, 49% of French and 29% of British 
plants were single establishments, so that the demand for networking activities would be 
greater in France than in Britain.  
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Compared with Britain, employer networking activity in France is embedded in a richer web 
of collective employment relations activities which will bring greater contact with other 
employers. We expect the interaction between country, employment relations and incentive 
choice to differ between the two countries, with a stronger effect in France. Compared with 
the country coefficient on France of 0.211 for merit pay shown in Table 3, when we introduce 
the institutional variables as interactions, the figure falls markedly. Considered in isolation, 
the interaction with local networking activities causes the country coefficient to drop by about 
8% (from 0.211 to 0.195, Table 4). The interaction with the other institutional variables, 
having a workplace union representative, being covered by a pay agreement and affiliation to 
a national employer organisation, causes the coefficient on France to drop by 18%, from 
0.211 to 0.173. However, when considering the effect of local activities in conjunction with 
these other institutional factors, they cause the country coefficient to drop by a further 20%, 
from 0.173 to 0.136, bringing it close to non-significance. Thus, these results both trace the 
boost given to the use of merit pay in France by the more effective employer networking and 
also highlight the importance of their being embedded within the wider framework employer 
activities. 
 
REPONSE provides additional evidence on the strategic role of these employer network 
activities in France. Establishments whose managers regularly take part in HR club activities 
are more intensive users of individualised pay increases and of appraisal than are non-
participants, and they have become increasingly so since 1992.
22 Through 1992, 1998 and 
2004, among HR club participants, those using individualisation rose from 58% to 83%. 
Likewise, those using appraisals increased from 44% to 66%. In both cases, use by non-
participants was lower and increased by considerably less. HR club participants were also 
more likely than non-participants in 2004 to agree or discuss locally the budgets and criteria 
for awarding merit pay: 26% against 15% for budgets, and 19% against 11% for criteria. 
 
Finally, Eustache (1986) and Linhart et al (1993) suggest that national employer pay 
negotiators helped the spread of individualisation by seeking settlements for pay increases 
that left room for local level developments, whether by negotiation or unilaterally. Although it 
is widely known that French industry agreements set minimum rates some way below 
employees’ actual earnings (Meurs and Skalli, 1997), they remain influential on annual pay 
increases, and leaving part of the cost-of-living to be made up at local level gives individual 
employers more scope for innovations in pay systems. 
 
 Three checks on the robustness of the effect of networking on merit pay are used. We applied 
the most restrictive definition (a) of merit pay shown in Section 2 above. The coefficient on 
networking independent establishments in the pooled regression is slightly lower, and 
significant at the 7% level, but this may be because only half of the original number of 
establishments qualify as operating merit pay, and those running separate evaluations for pay 
are omitted. Secondly, we included country interactions for the four employment relations 
variables (workplace reps, coverage, national affiliation, and networking) in order to capture 
the greater institutional embeddedness of networking in France. The effect is mainly to 
reinforce the impact of the networking measure, which remains positive and significant at the 
3% level. Thirdly, we ran a poisson regression on the number of systems operated by an 
establishment to gain an alternative view on the sophistication of incentive pay policies 
(Appendix Table 5). Again, independent establishments engaged in networking were more 
likely to use multiple incentive pay systems, this being significant at 3% in the pooled 
analysis, 2% for France, and positive but not significant for Britain. 
                                                 




Fiscal incentives for profit-sharing and employee share-ownership have also played a part 
in the development of these forms of incentive pay, it was argued, largely by reducing the cost 
to the employer of adopting such pay systems. Given the pattern of fiscal incentives for profit-
sharing, current in France but discontinued in Britain, one would expect a positive coefficient 
on the dummy for France, predicting that French establishments are one-third more likely to 
use profit-sharing. Fiscal reliefs for shares schemes are present in both countries, and the 
coefficient is considerably smaller. Both figures are somewhat lower than the relative 
frequencies of Table 1, suggesting that measures to reduce the operational cost of an incentive 
scheme affect but do not necessarily override other considerations for managers.  
 
One consequence of government fiscal incentives is that employers may be more willing to 
risk a mismatch between their organisational needs the incentive system. As a result, one 
would expect the effects of work organisation on the adoption incentive pay to be weaker, 
resulting in regression coefficients that are less well determined than for the other pay 
systems. Thus we observe the weak influence of many of the variables that NEP theory 
predicts should be correlated with collective incentives, such as teams, small group activities, 
and the measures associated with mutual adjustment. On the other hand, there are signs that 
firms with profit-sharing have been using appraisals, which may stem from a concern to 
reduce free-rider effects within group incentives. 
 
As a final robustness check on the whole of the pooled regressions and on the argument of 
this paper, we computed the same regressions separately for each country. The results are 
shown in Appendix Table 4. Two main conclusions stand out. First, although the individual 
country regressions lead to broadly similar conclusions concerning the effects of the work and 
establishment organisation variables, the results appear considerably closer to the theoretical 
predictions for France than for Britain, even when using the adjusted significance levels for 
Britain which allow for the smaller sample numbers. Thus the evidence supporting these 
theories appears to be weaker for Britain than it does for France. This leads to a second 
conclusion illustrated by the different sectoral and establishment size effects in the two 
countries. In Britain, the financial sector exerts a strong influence on the adoption of incentive 
pay, and education and health a consistently negative influence. In France, the sectors most 
using incentive pay include utilities, construction, distribution and business services. Health 
and education were low users as in Britain. The greater array of distinct sectoral influences in 
France seems likely to reflect the sectoral pattern of French employer organisations, 
especially as many of the other factors likely to influence choice are present in the 
regressions. Turning to establishment size, in Britain, large establishments with 1000 or more 
employees are more likely to use incentive pay, especially merit pay and share schemes, 
whereas in France, medium-sized ones seem to be the greatest users. These patterns are 
consistent with the institutional argument developed in this paper. The closer alignment of 
French practice to theory suggests that French managers have had to invest more in 
developing incentive pay systems that fit with their conditions. The lesser sectoral influence, 
and greater impact of large establishments in Britain suggests that collective solutions have 
figured less than in France, and that adoption of incentive pay has depended more on 
establishments using their own internal resources which are more available in large units 
possessing their own specialist HR function. 
 
Thus, it seems that a significant part of the gap in incentive use between British and French 
private establishments in 2004 can be explained by institutional differences in the 
organisation of labour markets in the two countries, government action, and in the case of 
merit pay, by the greater ability of French employers to coordinate their activities on incentive 





Bringing together the two national workplace surveys has made it possible to break new 
ground in an old debate about whether HR practices are determined largely by factors internal 
to the organisation, in this case the influence of work organisation, monitoring and appraisal 
on the choice of performance incentives, or whether they are determined by societal, 
institutional factors. With a good deal of caution about the comparability of measures used by 
the two surveys, it has been possible to show that work organisation factors do indeed 
influence the choice of incentive pay system, particularly when we look across the full range 
of the four types examined in this paper. However, it is clear that when controlling for their 
influence, as well as for sector and establishment size, a substantial unexplained gap remains 
between the rates of adoption in the two countries. French establishments make more 
intensive use of both individual and collective pay incentives for their non-managerial 
employees. Without being able to quantify it precisely, we have been able to show that 
institutional factors exert a substantial influence on firms’ choices. This is partly reflected in 
the country dummies and their interactions, but also in other variables in the regressions 
which enable us to trace some of the processes behind the institutional effects. 
 
Analysis of these surveys also shows that ‘institutional’ need not be confined to formal 
institutions, and even when it does, as in the case of employment protection, necessity can be 
the mother of invention. Restricting the dismissal threat encouraged employers to develop 
alternative motivational practices. Often, these practices are not available ‘off-the-peg’, and 
need to be developed, hence the importance of the learning processes involved. The French 
field studies show that initially many employers did not appreciate their importance, hence the 
divisiveness and conflict associated with the early schemes. Formal institutions in this case 
strengthened the process of networking and peer activities among employers, especially in 
France, which in turn helped them to develop coordinated solutions to the externality 
problems they faced. While the local associations supported the networks, national 
associations could create the headroom for local pay initiatives, and existing workplace 
institutions created opportunities for developing procedural justice measures to support the 
more sophisticated pay systems: hence the importance of local workplace representation to 
discussing and agreeing the kitties and criteria for merit pay. In generating a critical mass of 
innovating employers, these activities may also have reduced fears of poaching. In contrast, 
the more weakly institutionalised labour market environment in Britain has left firms freer to 
use the dismissal threat as a motivator, and where those using incentive pay have tended to be 
large, or else to rely on low operational cost ones, namely profit and share schemes. 
 
Inevitably, studies such as this one are subject to limitations. Despite the great comparability 
of methods and concepts used in the two surveys, it is never possible to replicate questions 
completely because of the different institutional environments in which the surveys are 
carried out. The term ‘merit pay’ is a good example. For one of our key arguments, notably on 
employer networking and learning, we had to rely on indirect measures which establish a 
plausible case, but not one that can be proven. There are also limitations because of the need 
to rely on the 2004 cross-section for much of the analysis, the panel elements of the two 
surveys being less comparable and more limited. The choice of statistical method was a 
compromise between two constraints. Sceptics might object that the adoption of incentive pay 
schemes has little to do with motivation, and that we have taken the wrong theories. In fact, 
the majority of management respondents to REPONSE stressed the motivational benefits of 
both merit pay and profit-sharing, a view shared by a substantial, but smaller, number of 22 
 
employee representatives.
23 Finally, as with all such studies, there must be doubts about the 
endogeneity of the some of the processes that are treated as exogenous. One such is the level 
of employment protection, treated as exogenous in our analysis, but in the longer term, one 
has to ask why workers seek and employers accept varying degrees of protection in different 
economies, such as might be affected by the prevalence of internal labour markets (Eyraud et 
al. 1990). Perhaps more questionable is to treat choice of work system as independent of 
choice of incentive pay system. This is justifiable if organisations choose first their work 
systems, and then consider how to reward their employees, and is consistent with the 
approach of the NEP and strategic pay theories. It would be more questionable if 
organisations implemented whole bundles of work system and reward practices, however 
most organisations implement them piecemeal. 
 
Finally, some key assumptions go beyond the data provided by the two surveys, and this is of 
course true of the inferences about the importance of externalities. As with Levine and Tyson 
(1990) and Appelbaum and Batt (1994), the argument that externalities have held back the 
spread of different types of incentive pay depends on evidence that their adoption would 
improve business performance. There is now considerable evidence that incentive pay can 
improve performance, notably for IPBR, profit-sharing and employee share ownership 
(Bryson and Freeman, 2007). Although not conclusive, owing in part to numerous 
measurement problems, it provides a good basis for believing that firms can improve 
performance by achieving the right ‘fit’ between incentives, work systems and other HR 
strategies. The argument of this paper has also been one of ‘fit’. The evidence for Britain in 
this paper is consistent with the idea of this kind of equilibrium: establishments without pay 
incentives are lower paid, perform less well than their peers, have less job autonomy, less 
appraisal, less computers, and although not statistically significant, less stable employment, 
less small group activities, less teamwork and less training. This may be a form of low-
incentive, low-HRM equilibrium into which many firms may settle. It exists in both countries 
but is more extensive in Britain. If more French firms have climbed out of it, it is because of 
the push from greater employment protection, and the pull from the network activities that 
have supported learning about the advantages and operation of different approaches to 
incentives and the management of performance.  
 
                                                 
23  For example, 85% of management respondents to REPONSE believed that merit pay motivated their 
employees, that it was fairer than the same increase for all (82%), and that it was not divisive (52%). 62% 




Appendix 1:  The Two Surveys 
 
WERS (Workplace Employment Relations Survey) and REPONSE (Relations 
Professionnelles et Négociations d’Entreprise) are surveys of representative samples of about 
2000 establishments carried out respectively in Great Britain and France. The surveys were 
carried for the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and the 
Policy Studies Institute (PSI) in Britain, and the DARES of the Ministry of Labour in France. 
The analysis is restricted to private sector establishments with 20 or more employees, the 
coverage of the 2004 REPONSE, and uses the establishment weights provided to adjust for 
sample stratification and a measure of non-response. It also excludes private firms classified 
as Public Administration in France. These were adjusted for the different number of country 
observations in the pooled regression. More information about the surveys can be found in 
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7. Main Text Tables and Charts 
Table 1. Use of incentive pay systems in France and Great Britain in 2004 
(% of establishments) 
   
Incentive pay for non-managerial employees  GB France 
Individual incentive pay  %%  
Merit pay (situations (a) + (b))  12.6 41.8 
Merit pay if appraisal linked to pay (situation (a) only)  6.6 22.1 
Merit pay (a) + (b) (all employees including managers)  14.4 52.9 
‘Merit pay’ (GB) & ‘individualised increases’ (Fr)  
unrefined situation (c) non-managers*  21.3 75.9 
IPBR 29.5 55.7 
IPBR (all employees including managers)  34.7 70.6 
Any type of individual incentive pay  36.6 68.7 
Exclusively individual incentive pay  13.2 23.1 
    
Collective incentive pay    
Profit-sharing 20.6 41.8 
Profit-sharing (any occupational group, including managers)** 41.9 41.8 
Collective incentive pay (group, establishment etc bonuses***)  20.7 50.2 
Profit-sharing & collective bonuses  7.9 33.2 
Any type of collective incentive pay  33.4 58.6 
Exclusively collective incentive pay  10.1 13.0 
  
Any of the above individual or collective pay incentives 46.6 81.7 
   
Employee share ownership schemes    
Employee share ownership  19.9 10.4 
Either share ownership or profit-sharing   33.5 45.7 
Either share ownership or profit-sharing (inc managers)**  51.6 45.7 
    
Absence of incentive pay, NIP (non-mgrs) ****    
Absence of incentive pay (pay schemes only)  53.4 18.3 
Absence of incentive pay (pay & share schemes)  46.6 17.8 
    
Combinations of specific pay schemes  (non-managers)    
Merit pay & IPBR  5.5 28.6 
Merit pay & profit sharing  4.2 22.9 
IPBR & profit sharing  8.3 25.0 
Any individual & any collective incentive pay  23.3 45.6 
 
Source: Réponse and WERS 2004, private sector establishments with 20 or more employees, using 
establishment weights.  
* Note: the definitions shown here correspond to different concepts: ‘merit pay’ as defined by WERS and 
‘individualised pay increases’ as requested by REPONSE. 
** In France, profit sharing and share schemes must be available to all employees in order to qualify for tax 
relief, as do some share schemes in Britain. 
*** In Réponse, collective bonuses include profit sharing (intéressement). 
**** NIP is defined as absence of IPBR, merit pay, profit-sharing and any other forms of collective pay 
incentive recorded in the two surveys, the most important of which concern the category (c) of merit pay, 
discussed in Section 2. Share schemes are not counted as incentive pay. 30 
 
Table 2. Expected signs of the regression coefficients on the key variables 
 










(Skill and job 
complexity) 
Training intensity +, 
Formal quals + (inversely 
proxied by OJT for 
skilled jobs,  
Computer use +, Prof & 
Tech occupations+ 




     
Mutual adjustment  Teams +, QCs +, Job 
rotation +  - -  -  +  ++ 
Standardisation  JIT +, TQM +, Monitor 
absence +, Use of 
targets+, Agency use ++, 
Admin & sales + 
- -  ++  n/s  - 
Direct control  Fix-term emp +, 
Secondary LM (proxied 
by % women) + 
+  n/s  - -  - - 
Employee discretion  Job autonomy +  - ++  +  + 
Procedural justice 
measures 
Appraise +,  
Agree apprsl criteria +, 
Good ER climate + 
- -  n/s  ++  n/s 
Pay strategy  Pay, profitability > 
average +  - -  +/-  +/-  ++ 
Market strategy  Compete on quality + / 
price +  Price+ Price+  Quality+  Quality+ 
Workplace TU presence  TU rep +  
CB coverage +  n/s +  +/- +/- 
Employer networking  Local activities & single 
estab +,  Foreign +, 
National association only 
(-) 
- -  +  ++  n/s 
Employment protection  Strong protection,  
& for merit pay: 
employment size 
threshold*France 
- -  +  ++  ++ 
Government support for 
profit/share schemes 
Strong support 
n/s n/s  +/- ++ 
 
Note: the sign indicates the expected direction of the relationship, a double sign indicates an expected strong 
relationship, and n/s denotes an expected zero or non-significant relationship. +/- contrasted theoretical predictions.  
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Table 3. Pooled logit regressions on type of pay system in Great Britain and France in 2004 (Marginal effects) 
  NIP    IPBR    Merit    Pay     
Profit- 
sharing   
Share 
schemes   
  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t 
France  -0.678   -8.63  ****  0.471 6.27  ****  0.211   2.89  ****  0.335 5.13  ****  -0.148 -3.38    **** 
Skill complexity                          
Training intensity  -0.035   -0.70  -  0.076 1.30  +  0.108   2.13  **  0.029 0.53  -  0.017 0.67    - 
OJT for skill jobs  0.090   1.59  +  -0.083 -1.23  -  0.109   1.96  **  -0.116 -2.08 **  0.085 3.08    **** 
% using computer  -0.125   -2.62  ****  0.097 1.68  *  0.175   3.58  ****  0.063 1.15  -  -0.019 -0.72    - 
% managers & prof  0.089   0.93  -  -0.038 -0.36  -  0.291   3.27  ****  -0.100 -1.02 -  0.076 1.70    * 
% technicians  0.064   0.89  -  0.113 1.23  -  0.222   2.78  ****  -0.029 -0.37 -  0.007 0.15    - 
Type of coordination                          
a) Mutual adjustment                          
Teams  0.022   0.73  -  -0.036 -1.01  -  0.027   0.87  -  0.031 0.95  -  0.038 2.23    ** 
Small group activities  -0.001   -0.04  -  0.029 0.70  -  0.149   4.18  ****  0.043 1.13  -  0.040 1.79    * 
Job rotation  0.025   0.80  -  -0.054 -1.53  +  -0.030   -1.05  -  0.008 0.24  -  -0.020 -1.44    + 
b) Standardisation                          
Business targets  -0.090   -2.06  **  0.210 3.82  ****  0.113   2.29  **  0.052 1.09  -  0.076 3.11    **** 
Total quality workplace  -0.064   -2.47  ***  0.065 2.21  **  0.058   2.37  ***  -0.006 -0.21 -  -0.018 -1.36    + 
Monitor absence  -0.084   -3.14  ****  0.088 3.04  ****  0.017   0.68  -  0.038 1.47  +  0.023 1.68    * 
Use agency staff  -0.133   -5.49  ****  0.115 3.75  ****  0.095   3.55  ****  0.089 3.19  ****  0.010 0.66    - 
% admin & sales  -0.132   -2.19  **  0.231 3.24  ****  0.155   2.53  ***  0.191 2.89  ****  0.054 1.96    ** 
c) Direct control                          
% fix term employees  -0.073   -0.47  -  0.152 0.77  -  0.321   1.96  *  -0.206 -1.15 -  -0.024 -0.29    - 
% fix-term & no growth  0.105   0.42  -  -0.140 -0.42  -  -0.596   -2.24  **  0.093 0.29  -  0.011 0.09    - 
% women  0.110   1.87  *  -0.159 -2.20  **  -0.060   -0.92  -  -0.154 -2.39 ***  0.005 0.17    - 
Job discretion                          
Job autonomy  -0.250   -2.90  ****  0.362 3.00  ****  -0.174   -1.43  +  0.152 1.53  +  -0.068 -1.60    + 
Job autonomy*france  0.316   3.21  ****  -0.496 -3.82  ****  0.209   1.64  +  -0.128 -1.19 -  0.065 1.30    + 
Procedural justice                           
Appraisals  -0.220   -7.31  ****  0.068 1.77  *  omitted     0.141  4.15  ****  0.043 2.28    ** 
Good ER climate  -0.106   -1.65  *  0.010 0.14  -  0.170   2.71  ****  0.149 2.21  **  0.028 0.78    - 
Pay strategy indicators                          
Pay above industry average  -0.067   -2.32  **  0.020 0.59  -  -0.062   -2.21  **  0.038 1.19  -  -0.005 -0.30    - 
Relative financial perf  -0.094   -1.49  +  0.005 0.07  -  0.069   1.01  -  0.095 1.39  +  0.087 2.68    **** 
Compete on price  0.041   1.15  -  -0.033 -0.81  -  -0.022   -0.64  -  0.033 0.90  -  -0.013 -0.70    - 
Compete on quality  -0.029   -1.11  -  0.047 1.44  +  0.026   0.92  -  0.050 1.69  *  -0.027 -2.03    ** 32 
 
  NIP    IPBR    Merit    Pay     
Profit- 
Sharing   
Share 
schemes   
  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t  dy/dx  t  sig t 
Associational activities                          
Workplace TU rep  -0.023   -0.82  -  -0.064 -1.99  **  0.017   0.61  -  0.097 3.34  ****  0.004 0.24    - 
Pay Agt coverage  0.066   2.29  **  -0.062 -1.89  *  -0.022   -0.82  -  -0.010 -0.35 -  0.039 2.60    **** 
Employer National Body 
Only 0.094    2.96  ****  -0.049 -1.40  +  -0.053   -1.81  *  0.010 0.32  -  0.026 1.53    + 
Employer local activities  0.056   1.54  +  -0.041 -0.99  -  -0.031   -0.94  -  0.014 0.39  -  -0.004 -0.27    - 
Local activities & single est  -0.079   -1.78  *  0.115 2.02  **  0.129   2.53  ***  0.005 0.09  -  0.016 0.50    - 
Establishment size                          
Single establishment  0.069   2.25  **  -0.028 -0.78  -  -0.118   -3.66  ****  -0.160 -4.58 ****  -0.079 -4.09    **** 
Emp size 50-99  0.015   0.54  -  -0.037 -1.14  -  0.026   0.91  -  0.060 2.08  **  0.017 1.09    - 
Emp size 100-199  -0.016   -0.53  -  -0.047 -1.39  +  -0.006   -0.21  -  0.064 2.06  **  0.016 0.94    - 
Emp size 200-499  -0.063   -1.94  *  -0.059 -1.50  +  0.047   1.36  +  0.118 3.29  ****  0.088 4.13    **** 
Emp size 500-999  -0.042   -0.96  -  -0.040 -0.89  -  0.101   2.46  ***  0.110 2.68  ****  0.086 3.50    **** 
Emp size >=1000  -0.041   -0.90  -  -0.125 -2.37  ***  0.076   1.58  +  0.120 2.33  ***  0.190 5.27    **** 
Economic sector                          
Utilities  -0.144   -2.31  **  0.313 2.74  ****  0.287   2.09  **  0.170 1.08  -  0.196 2.38    *** 
Construction  -0.079   -1.87  *  0.190 3.35  ****  0.055   1.16  -  -0.123 -2.75 ****  0.026 0.94    - 
Distribution  -0.040   -0.97  -  0.096 2.01  **  0.153   3.44  ****  -0.051 -1.19 -  0.014 0.63    - 
Transport  0.076   1.36  +  -0.094 -1.53  +  -0.039   -0.72  -  -0.042 -0.76 -  0.028 0.87    - 
Finance  -0.134   -2.27  **  0.227 2.94  ****  0.244   3.10  ****  0.075 1.01  -  0.048 1.46    + 
Business services  -0.024   -0.59  -  0.115 2.43  ***  0.119   2.74  ****  -0.050 -1.23 -  0.004 0.19    - 
Education-Health (private)  0.505   6.49  ****  -0.333 -5.16  ****  -0.205   -3.79  ****  -0.279 -5.62 ****  -0.104 -3.94    **** 
Personal services  0.113   1.65  *  -0.026 -0.36  -  0.112   1.65  *  -0.118 -2.08 **  -0.011 -0.34    - 
Constant   5.57  ****    -5.93  ****    -8.54  ****    -6.27  ****    -6.97   **** 
                           
Pseudo  R2  0.3389     0.1632     0.2427     0.1756     0.1948    
n  3889     3889     3893     3889     3889    
 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%; + 20%, based on robust standard errors. Source: REPONSE, WERS 2004. Logit coefficients presented as marginal effects. 33 
 





coefficient t sig  t 
 dy/dx     
No interactions (as in Table 3)  0.211  3.33   **** 
      
Coefficient on France dummy in the presence of  
interactions with the institutional variables       
(a) Employer local activities  0.195 2.85   **** 
(b) Employer national body, workplace TU rep.,   
Pay agreement coverage.  0.173 2.44   *** 
(a) + (b) Employer local activities + Employer national 
body, workplace TU rep., Pay agreement coverage  0.136 1.66   * 
      
Coefficient on France dummy in the presence of  
interactions with establishment size thresholds   dy/dx t sig  t 
France coefficient  0.228 3.69   **** 
France * establishment size<40  -0.062 -1.76   * 
      
France coefficient  0.260 4.22   **** 
France * establishment size<50  -0.114 -2.07   ** 
      
France coefficient  0.231 3.82   **** 
France * establishment size<100  -0.037 -0.70   - 
Note: Sample coverage and other regression variables as in Table 3. 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%; 
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Figure 1. Decision tree matching work system characteristics to choice of incentive pay system 
 






 Key  output 
inter-
dependencies 






                   









By peers + 
line mgrs 
 Profit  share, 
work unit 
bonuses 

















                   
        






  By line mgrs   
Promotion-
based pay 


















                   



































8. Appendix Tables and Charts 
Appendix Table 1. Incentive system questions in WERS and REPONSE 
 
 WERS  REPONSE 
IPBR  Do any of the employees in this establishment 
get paid by results or receive merit pay?: 
Answer: PBR=1, MP=2. (fperf_ 636) 
 
Showcard: ‘Payment by results’ includes any 
method of payment where the pay is determined 
by the amount done or its value, rather than just 
the number of hours worked. It includes 
commission, and bonuses that are determined by 
individual, establishment or organisation 
productivity or performance. It does not include 
profit-related pay schemes. 
 
This can be combined with other questions, on 
individual performance (fmeasur_, 651) and 
occupational group (fperwh_, 639). 
 
In 2004, did non-managerial employees receive 
bonuses that are linked to individual 
performance (individual objectives, payment by 
results). (nprimi, Q 6.6). 
NOTE: question also enquires about general pay 
increases that are the same for all employees, 
and individualised increases, see below. 
Merit 
pay 
Do any of the employees in this establishment 
get paid by results or receive merit pay? Answer: 
PBR=1, MP=2. (fperf_ 636) 
 
Showcard: ‘Merit pay’ is related to a subjective 
assessment of individual performance by a 
supervisor or manager. 
 
What proportion of non-managerial employees at 
this workplace have their performance formally 
appraised? (fmeaspr, 778) 
 
In 2004, did non-managerial employees receive: 
Individualised pay increases, excluding 
individual or collective performance bonuses, 
(naugmi, Q 6.6). 
 
Do non-managerial employers periodically have 
review meetings with their line-manager (eg. 
performance evaluation, review, objective 
setting)?  
Replies: All, some, none. (nentret, Q.10a) 
 
For the LOG, which of the following criteria are 
used to select employees for individualised 
increases (or promotions) in 2004?  
a) intensity of work effort; b) capacity to 
respond to unexpected demands; c) achievement 
of precise individual objectives set in advance; 
d) contribution to team-work; e) commitment to 
goals of the enterprise. (augint ff, Q 6.8a) 
Profit 
sharing 
Do any employees at this workplace receive 
profit-related payments or profit-related 
bonuses? (frprof, 659) 
Plants with management only schemes identified 
by means of fnonman (674). 
Are employees in your establishment covered by 
an agreement on ‘intéressement’ for 2004 (as 
defined by the 1986 government regulation)? 




Does this company operate any of the employee 
share schemes listed on this card for any of the 
employees at this workplace? : 
Share Incentive Plan (SIP), Save As You Earn 
(SAYE or Sharesave), Enterprise Management 
Incentives (EMI), Company Share Option Plan 
(CSOP), Other employee share scheme (fshare1, 
676). 
 
Do employees own shares in the enterprise? 
Next question enquires about type of scheme: 
issue reserved for employees, distribution of free 
shares, stock options, individual share purchase 
(eg privatisation), investment in an company 
savings scheme, employee buy-out, company is 
a workers’ cooperation (SCOP). (actions, Q 
6.17a). 
 
Note: variable names and position or question numbers from the surveys are shown in parentheses. LOG: largest 
occupational group. Non-managerial schemes were identified in WERS using the questions on occupational 
coverage, and in REPONSE, respondents were asked separate questions about individualised increases and 
bonuses for managers and for non-managers. For Britain we used managerial and professional occupations to 
gain a group of similar size to that of ‘cadres’ used by REPONSE. The occupational categories available for 
both data sets are very broad, somewhat less detailed than ISCO at the one-digit level. 36 
 
 
Appendix Table 2. Linking of survey questions to work environment measures 
 
  WERS REPONSE 




Complex v. simple 
skills  
Training intensity: average days training 
for LOG members in past year, (ctrain, 
322) [Note: index used is relative 
intensity within each country]. 
OJT for skill jobs: time to reach skilled 
level for LOG (cstuckin, 318) 
% employees using computers); 
(ccomput, 539) 
% of managerial & professional; 
% technical staff; based on on WERS 
mgt respondents 
 
Training intensity: training expenditure 
for 2004 as % of pay bill (depform, 5.4a) 
 
 
OJT for skill jobs: time to reach skilled 
level for LOG 
% employees using computers  (micro, 
5.12);  
% of managerial & professional;  





a) Mutual adjustment  Teams: majority of LOG in formally 
designated teams, (cteams, 352). 
Small group activities: quality circles & 
workshop meetings with line managers: 
(dcircles + dbrief, 472, 381) 
Job rotation for majority for employees: 
% of LOG do jobs other than their own 
>= once a week (cothdo, 346) 
Teams: majority of employees in 
autonomous production teams (groupau, 
5.12). 
Small group activities: quality circles & 
workshop meetings with line managers: 
(cq04 + ra04, 3.3a)). 
Job rotation: do employees move 
between jobs as part of their usual work 
(mobil, 5.8a); does the majority do so 
(majmob, 5.8b)? 
b) Standardisation  Business targets: profits, sales, total 
costs, labour costs, quality (ktarge, 
1379),  
Total Quality Management: attained 
quality standards BS5750 or ISO9000? 
(kwrkplac, 1360) 
Monitor absence: keeps records of 
absence (krecper1, 1370) 
Use of buffer staff (agency); % 
temporary agency staff (zagency,  92) 
% administrative & sales staff: based on 
WERS mgt respondent data 
Business targets: objrent, objcroi, 
objbudg, objcout, objqual (4.6a) 
 
TQM : Démarche ‘qualité totale’ 
(qualtot : 5.13a) 
 
Monitor absence: use absence records to 
assess workplace climate (abscli, 8.3) 
Use of buffer staff (agency): % agency 
staff at year end (inter_nb, 0.9) 
% administrative & sales staff: based on 
data supplied by DARES 
c) Direct control  % fixed term employees: working on 
temporary or fixed-term contracts 
(zfixterm, 90). 
% fixed term employees in plants with 
no employment growth: Interaction of 
above combined with employment 
change over past year (zallemps-
zemp1ago, 2 & 57) taking quantile 
ranges to match French interval scale. 
% secondary labour market workers: 
proxied by % women employees. 
% fixed term employees: employees with 
fixed duration contracts (cdd 0.2b) 
 
% fixed term employees in plants with 
no employment growth: interaction of 
above combined with whether volume of 
activity of plant growing over past 3 
years, no growth if said to be stable or 
declining (croiss, 4.1)  
% secondary labour market workers: 
proxied by % women employees. 
Job Discretion in work 
roles 
Job discretion: involvement in decisions 
over how work is organised (cdesign 
351); discretion over how do work 
(cdiscret 349); control over pace of work 
(control, 350) [Note: index used is 
weighted score of each binary variable] 
Job discretion:  in the case of minor 
incidents, refer to supervisor or resolve 
oneself (autonom, 5.7); work defined by 
precise tasks or global objectives (ordres 
5.6); frequency of management 
monitoring of work (control, 5.10) 
Procedural justice 
measures 
Appraisal: % of non-manager employees 
have performance formally appraised 
(fmeaspr 778); 
Appraisal: non-manager employees have 
a periodic appraisal discussion with line-
manager (nentret, 6.10a); 37 
 
Good employment relations climate - 
management respondent: how would 
you rate the relationship between 
management and employees generally at 
this workplace?  (mrelate, 1427) 
Good employment relations climate - 
management respondent: how would 
you describe the current social climate in 
your workplace? (climat, 8.1) 
Pay & Business strategy    
Pay strategy  Pay above the industry average: 
calculated using WERS management 
respondent pay data for plant average 
earnings and sectoral average. 
 
Relative financial performance: 
Management respondent estimate 
comparing with other establishments in 
same industry (kestper1, 1411). 
Pay above the industry average: 
estimated using plant average earnings 
provided from a separate source by 
DARES & comparing with sector 
average. 
Relative financial performance: 
Management respondent: profitability 
compared with main competitors (rentab, 
4.12) 
 
Product Market strategy  Compete on price: demand for main 
product depends on lower prices than 
competitors (kprice 1341)  
Compete on quality: demand for main 
product depends on offering better 
quality than competitors?; 
(kqual, 1342) 
Compete on price: is competing price the 
firm’s main strategy – select from a list 
of alternatives (strat1, 4.10) 
Compete on quality: is competing 
product or service quality the firm’s 
main strategy – select from a list of 
alternatives (strat1, 4.10) 
    
Institutional resources    
Workplace union rep 
and collective 
agreement on bonuses 
Workplace employee representative: 
presence of a trade union rep or steward 
in the workplace (excl health and safety) 
(esteward, 566). 
Collective agreement on bonuses: 
proportion of employees in plant whose 
pay is set by collective agreement 
(fcover, 744)  
Workplace employee representative: are 
there recognised union delegates in the 
workplace (dsetab, 2.1) 
 
Collective agreement on bonuses: 
Branch collective agreement used for 
calculation of bonuses (ccanc, 6.5) 
[Note: if a branch agreement covers an 
establishment it generally relates to all 




National employer association only 
(excluding local activities): 
Establishment a member of a national 
Employers or Trade Association 
(bmember, 218). 
Local employer activities: 
Establishment a member of a local 
employers or business organisation or 
other similar group (bmember, 218) 
National employer association only 
(excluding local activities): Management 
takes part in an industry employers’ 
organisation (branch, 1.10). 
Local employer activities: 
Management takes part in a local 
employers’ organisation or HR or 
entrepreneur’s ‘club’ (branch, 1.10). 
    
Single establishment  Single establishment: single independent 
establishment not belonging to another 
body (asingle, 94) 
Single establishment: Number of 
establishments owned by the enterprise 
in France (multi, 0.6) 
Employment size  As in Table 3, omitted size: 20-49  As in Table 3, omitted size: 20-49 
Sector   As in Table 3, omitted sector: 
Manufacturing. 
 As in Table 3, omitted sector: 
Manufacturing. 
 
Notes: Numbers appearing next to variable names are the location number for WERS and the question number 
for Réponse 2004. LOG: largest occupational group. 38 
Appendix Table 3. Means and standard deviations of variables  
Variable description  Variable  
type GB    France   
    Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
No incentive pay  Binary  0.528 0.499  0.184 0.387 
IPBR  Binary  0.299 0.458  0.556    0.497 
Merit Pay  Binary  0.129 0.335  0.417    0.493 
Profit-sharing  Binary  0.207 0.405  0.418    0.493 
Share scheme  Binary  0.254 0.435  0.103    0.305 
Training intensity  Scale  0.570 0.290  0.426    0.236 
OJT for skill jobs  Scale  0.676 0.207  0.736    0.219 
% using computer  Scale  0.496 0.289  0.379    0.310 
% managers & professionals  Scale  0.179 0.182  0.134    0.171 
% technicians  Scale  0.068 0.146  0.229    0.196 
Teams (40/50%+ in teams)  Binary  0.723 0.448  0.208    0.406 
Small group activities  Scale  0.522 0.313  0.636    0.366 
Job rotation (affects majority)  Binary  0.195 0.396  0.197    0.398 
Business targets  Binary  0.596 0.355  0.779    0.263 
Total quality workplace  Binary  0.314 0.464  0.504    0.500 
Monitor absence  Binary  0.820 0.384  0.574    0.495 
Core workforce (use of agency staff)  Scale  0.203 0.403  0.376    0.485 
% admin & sales  Scale  0.394 0.325  0.264    0.284 
% fix term employees  Scale  0.055 0.179  0.056    0.128 
% fix-term & no growth  Scale  0.032 0.118  0.028    0.070 
% women  Scale  0.449 0.286  0.379    0.268 
Job autonomy  Scale  0.572 0.237  0.349    0.281 
Appraisals Scale  0.730 0.407  0.631    0.429 
Good ER climate  Scale  0.864 0.128  0.875    0.187 
Workplace TU rep  Binary  0.103 0.304  0.369 0.483 
Pay Agreement coverage  Binary  0.183 0.370  0.621    0.457 
Pay above industry average  Binary  0.443 0.497  0.309    0.462 
Relative financial performance  Scale  0.647 0.196  0.531    0.168 
Compete on price  Binary  0.616 0.283  0.204    0.403 
Compete on quality  Binary  0.402 0.490  0.636    0.481 
Employer National Body Only  Binary  0.206 0.405  0.257 0.437 
Employer local activities  Binary  0.369 0.483  0.383    0.486 
Local activities & single establishment  Binary  0.112 0.316  0.195    0.396 
Single establishment  Binary  0.291 0.455  0.493    0.500 
Emp size 50-99  Binary  0.194 0.396  0.202    0.402 
Emp size 100-199  Binary  0.090 0.286  0.096    0.294 
Emp size 200-499  Binary  0.051 0.219  0.050    0.219 
Emp size 500-999  Binary  0.011 0.106  0.010    0.101 
Emp size >=1000  Binary  0.004 0.064  0.003    0.059 
Utilities Binary  0.003 0.050  0.012    0.108 
Construction Binary  0.064 0.245  0.088    0.283 
Distribution Binary  0.356 0.479  0.204    0.403 
Transport Binary  0.062 0.241  0.071    0.256 
Finance Binary  0.044 0.206  0.035    0.183 
Business services  Binary  0.154 0.361  0.180    0.384 
Education-Health (private)  Binary  0.115 0.319  0.090    0.286 
Personal services  Binary  0.050 0.218  0.073    0.261 
N    1151   2738  
 
Note: binary variables have values 0 or 1, and ‘scaled’ variable values range between 0 and 1. Omitted 
categories for the regressions are: occupation: % manual occupations; employment size 20-49; sector: 
manufacturing. All values based on establishment weights. Private sector establishments with >=20 employees. 39 
 
Details of composite variables: 
Job autonomy: based on scope for problem-solving, discretion and work pace. Score of 3 if all 
three present, zero if none; rescaled to 0-1 for the regression analysis. 
Training intensity: based on training expenditures in France and training days in Britain; 
rescaled to 0-1. 
OJT duration for skilled jobs: zero to six months, rescaled to 0-1. 
Teams: =1 if the majority of employees work in teams. 
Small group activities: use of quality circles and workshop meetings. Score of 1 if both 
present, 0.5 if one only, 0 if none. 
Targets set for establishment: targets for profits, sales, overall costs, labour costs, and quality; 
scaled 0-1. 
 




Appendix Table 4a. Summary logit regressions on type of pay system in 2004: Great Britain 
Variable description  NIP  t  sig 
Sig 












scheme t  sig 
Sig 
adj 
Skill complexity                               
Training intensity  -0.048   -0.50   - -  0.104 1.30  + ## 0.003 0.07    - - -0.021 -0.32  - -  -0.019 -0.32    - - 
OJT for skill jobs  0.162   1.11   - #  -0.197 -1.67 * ## 0.052 0.82    - - -0.012 -0.15  - -  0.169 2.10    ** ## 
% using computer  -0.142   -1.30   + ## 0.071 0.81  - -  0.061 1.20    - # 0.087 1.11  - #  -0.044 -0.65    - - 
% managers & prof  0.183   0.88   - - -0.249 -1.63 + ## 0.018 0.26    - - -0.048 -0.37  - -  0.136 1.27    - # 
% technicians  0.135   0.76   - - -0.176 -1.15 - #  0.051 0.74    - - -0.069 -0.63  - -  0.107 0.82    - - 
Type of coordination                               
a) Mutual adjustment                               
Teams  -0.055   -0.84   - - -0.013 -0.23 - -  0.036 1.10    - # 0.046 1.06  - -  0.021 0.53    - - 
Small group activities  -0.080   -0.93   - -  0.069 0.94  - -  0.101 2.63    **** ##  0.039 0.65  - -  0.078 1.34    + ## 
Job rotation  0.012   0.18   - - -0.059 -1.12 - # -0.044 -1.80    * ## 0.037 0.90  - -  -0.001 -0.04    - - 
b) Standardisation                               
Business targets  -0.029   -0.33   - -  0.140 1.97  ** ##  -0.031 -0.75    - -  0.042 0.82  - -  0.124 2.27    ** ## 
Total quality 
workplace  0.052   0.77   - - -0.029 -0.58 - -  0.011 0.35    - - -0.090 -2.50  *** ##  0.076 2.09    ** ## 
Monitor absence  -0.148   -2.05   ** ##  0.112 2.06  ** ##  0.018 0.57    - -  0.028 0.62  - -  0.016 0.35    - - 
Use agency staff  -0.162   -2.42   *** ##  0.059 1.08  - # -0.009 -0.37    - -  0.133 2.74  **** ##  -0.025 -0.69    - - 
% admin & sales  -0.243   -1.92   * ##  0.097 1.05  - -  0.060 1.21    - # 0.138 1.66  * ##  0.069 1.06    - - 
c) Direct control                               
% fix term employees  -0.262   -0.81   - -  0.142 0.56  - -  0.198 2.19    ** ## -0.393 -1.68  * ## -0.066 -0.40    - - 
% fix-term & no 
growth  0.192   0.43   - - -0.034 -0.09 - -  -0.193 -1.57    + ## 0.428 1.42  + ##  0.020 0.09    - - 
% women  0.344   2.37   *** ##  -0.227 -1.92 * ## 0.013 0.19    - - -0.157 -1.77  * ##  0.176 2.01    ** ## 
Job discretion                               
Job autonomy  -0.324   -2.54   *** ##  0.363 3.65  **** ##  -0.061 -1.10    - # 0.029 0.45  - -  -0.128 -1.69    * ## 
Procedural justice                               
Appraisals  -0.248   -3.33   **** ##  0.035 0.53  - -  omitted      0.107 2.09  ** ##  0.116 2.46    *** ## 
Good ER climate  0.075   0.36   - - -0.086 -0.51 - -  -0.020 -0.23    - -  0.006 0.05  - -  0.040 0.30    - - 
Pay strategy 
indicators                               
Pay above industry 
average  -0.176   -2.93   **** ##  0.106 2.25  ** ##  -0.007 -0.25    - -  0.112 2.63  **** ##  0.009 0.24    - - 
Relative financial perf  -0.182   -1.38   + ##  -0.037 -0.34 - -  0.038 0.66    - -  0.136 1.80  * ##  0.140 1.89    * ## 
Compete on price  -0.058   -0.59   - - -0.049 -0.66 - -  -0.013 -0.31    - -  0.060 0.96  - -  -0.095 -1.85    * ## 41 
 
Compete on quality  0.037   0.66   - - -0.007 -0.18 - -  0.011 0.46    - -  0.028 0.82  - -  -0.045 -1.47    + ## 
Variable description  NIP  t  sig 
Sig 
















activities                               
Workplace TU rep  0.140   1.55   + ##  -0.041 -0.53 - -  -0.008 -0.18    - -  0.024 0.41  - -  0.008 0.16    - - 
Pay Agt coverage  0.053   0.55   - - -0.142 -1.52 + ##  -0.025 -0.48    - -  0.010 0.17  - -  0.142 2.68    **** ## 
Employer National 
Body Only  0.128   1.83   * ##  -0.019 -0.34 - -  -0.052 -2.06    ** ## -0.043 -1.08  - #  0.016 0.39    - - 
Employer local 
activities  0.067   0.95   - - -0.013 -0.23 - -  -0.040 -1.50    + ## 0.018 0.45  - -  0.027 0.74    - - 
Local activities & 
single est  -0.137   -1.05   - -  0.123 1.04  - -  0.161 1.68    * ##  -0.050 -0.67  - -  -0.045 -0.39    - - 
Establishment size                               
Single establishment  0.102   1.34   + ##  -0.101 -1.59 + ##  -0.075 -2.22    ** ##  0.029 0.53  - -  -0.157 -2.58    **** ## 
Emp size 50-99  0.037   0.58   - - -0.034 -0.68 - -  -0.029 -1.10    - # -0.032 -0.82  - -  0.043 1.07    - # 
Emp size 100-199  0.052   0.72   - - -0.050 -0.92 - -  -0.032 -1.24    - # -0.058 -1.45  + ##  0.055 1.17    - # 
Emp size 200-499  -0.093   -1.15   - #  -0.020 -0.33 - -  0.018 0.58    - - -0.039 -0.94  - -  0.135 2.69    **** ## 
Emp size 500-999  -0.048   -0.46   - - -0.044 -0.62 - -  0.097 2.02    ** ## -0.037 -0.75  - -  0.096 1.44    + ## 
Emp size >=1000  -0.145   -1.53   + ##  -0.042 -0.51 - -  0.187 3.47    **** ##  0.006 0.11  - -  0.147 2.14    ** ## 
Economic sector                               
Utilities  -0.122   -0.62   - -  0.017 0.10  - -  0.050 0.74    - -  0.002 0.01  - -  0.165 1.26    - # 
Construction  0.084   0.71   - - -0.053 -0.57 - -  0.089 1.28    - ##  -0.046 -0.73  - -  0.138 1.59    + ## 
Distribution  0.038   0.41   - - -0.037 -0.48 - -  0.046 1.06    - - -0.045 -0.78  - -  0.097 1.62    + ## 
Transport  0.029   0.25   - - -0.072 -0.76 - -  -0.019 -0.42    - - -0.030 -0.41  - -  0.195 1.72    * ## 
Finance  -0.381   -2.62   **** ##  0.370 2.72  **** ##  0.195 2.46    *** ##  0.113 1.30  + ##  0.238 2.25    ** ## 
Business services  -0.029   -0.29   - -  0.013 0.16  - -  0.143 2.46    *** ##  0.021 0.32  - -  0.036 0.55    - - 
Education-Health 
(private)  0.306   2.56   *** ##  -0.217 -2.18 ** ##  -0.033 -0.62    - - -0.134 -2.08  ** ##  -0.169 -2.80    **** ## 
Personal services  0.165   1.30   + ##  -0.115 -1.21 - #  0.014 0.21    - - -0.080 -1.09  - #  0.102 1.09    - # 
                                    
Pseudo  r2  0.1888       0.1501       0.1527       0.1535       0.2953      
N  1151       1151       1151       1151       1151      
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Appendix Table 4b. Logit regressions on type of pay system in 2004: France (marginal effects) 
Variable description  NIP  t  sig  IPBR  t  sig 
Merit 
pay t  sig 
Profit 
share t sig 
Share 
scheme t  sig 
Skill complexity                          
Training intensity  -0.026   -0.67   -  0.053 0.74  -  0.168 2.39  ***  0.042 0.62  -  0.046 1.77  * 
OJT for skill jobs  0.074   2.01   **  -0.031 -0.42 -  0.124 1.61  +  -0.121 -1.70 *  0.029 1.18  - 
% using computer  -0.086   -2.64   ****  0.094 1.40  +  0.239 3.58  ****  0.049 0.72  -  -0.001 -0.04 - 
% managers & prof  0.027   0.37   -  0.140 1.10  -  0.442 3.16  ****  -0.111 -0.86 -  0.069 1.44  + 
% technicians  0.009   0.19   -  0.245 2.30  **  0.307 2.74  ****  0.003 0.03  -  -0.017 -0.43 - 
Type of coordination                          
a) Mutual adjustment                          
Teams  0.037   1.61   +  -0.058 -1.42 +  0.037 0.87  -  0.031 0.76  -  0.031 1.77  * 
Small group activities  0.021   0.88   -  0.019 0.40  -  0.163 3.26  ****  0.037 0.78  -  0.025 1.20  - 
Job rotation  0.019   0.83   -  -0.040 -0.94 -  -0.002 -0.05 -  -0.017 -0.39 -  -0.025 -1.76 * 
b) Standardisation                          
Business targets  -0.086   -2.91   ****  0.235 3.59  ****  0.236 3.24  ****  0.098 1.49  +  0.049 1.98  ** 
Total quality workplace  -0.062   -3.43   ****  0.085 2.51  ***  0.083 2.45  ***  0.033 0.98  -  -0.034 -2.48 *** 
Monitor absence  -0.047   -2.85   ****  0.079 2.50  ***  0.021 0.64  -  0.041 1.33  +  0.019 1.58  + 
Use agency staff  -0.076   -4.63   ****  0.121 3.52  ****  0.135 3.62  ****  0.091 2.70  ****  0.011 0.74  - 
% admin & sales  -0.046   -1.06   -  0.278 3.14  ****  0.159 1.76  *  0.202 2.42  ***  0.036 1.14  - 
c) Direct control                          
% fix term employees  -0.052   -0.46   -  0.173 0.63  -  0.471 1.60  +  0.258 0.93  -  -0.049 -0.61 - 
% fix-term & no growth  0.103   0.58   -  -0.227 -0.45 -  -1.197 -1.98 **  -0.937 -1.94 *  0.153 1.17  - 
% women  0.033   0.91   -  -0.084 -1.02 -  -0.123 -1.39 +  -0.168 -2.07 **  -0.046 -1.68 * 
Job discretion                          
Job autonomy  0.033   1.07   -  -0.156 -2.60 ****  0.042 0.70  -  0.051 0.85  -  -0.000 -0.02 - 
Procedural justice                          
Appraisals  -0.124   -6.42   ****  0.061 1.47  +  omitted     0.142 3.36  ****  0.019 0.99  - 
Good ER climate  -0.076   -1.98   **  0.026 0.33  -  0.233 2.80  ****  0.176 2.19  **  0.026 0.90  - 
Pay strategy indicators                          
Pay above industry average  -0.022   -1.08   -  -0.038 -0.91 -  -0.090 -2.13 **  -0.011 -0.26 -  -0.014 -0.88 - 
Relative financial perf  -0.028   -0.61   -  0.039 0.45  -  0.081 0.83  -  0.062 0.67  -  0.073 2.08  ** 
Compete on price  0.008   0.32   -  0.004 0.08  -  0.016 0.29  -  0.023 0.44  -  0.007 0.32  - 
Compete on quality  -0.056   -2.59   ****  0.094 2.23  **  0.066 1.47  +  0.051 1.18  -  -0.010 -0.58 - 
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Variable description  NIP  t  sig  IPBR  t  sig 
Merit 
pay t  sig 
Profit 
share t sig 
Share 
scheme t  sig 
                          
Associational activities                          
Workplace TU rep  -0.031   -1.64   +  -0.049 -1.34 +  0.023 0.62  -  0.110 3.03  ****  -0.004 -0.29 - 
Pay Agt coverage  0.022   1.25   -  -0.034 -0.97 -  -0.007 -0.20 -  0.001 0.02  -  0.003 0.24  - 
Employer National Body Only  0.037   1.80   *  -0.044 -1.09 -  -0.039 -0.92 -  0.035 0.85  -  0.028 1.69  * 
Employer local activities  0.037   1.35   +  -0.045 -0.90 -  0.007 0.15  -  -0.006 -0.13 -  -0.013 -0.78 - 
Local activities & single est  -0.044   -1.58   +  0.109 1.76  *  0.108 1.66  *  0.058 0.91  -  0.023 0.83  - 
Establishment size                          
Single establishment  0.041   2.03   **  -0.001 -0.02 -  -0.128 -2.94 ****  -0.238 -5.89 ****  -0.053 -3.05 **** 
Emp size 50-99  0.004   0.19   -  -0.033 -0.88 -  0.072 1.85  *  0.102 2.75  ****  0.013 0.81  - 
Emp size 100-199  -0.025   -1.35   +  -0.047 -1.18 -  0.013 0.33  -  0.120 3.03  ****  -0.000 -0.03 - 
Emp size 200-499  -0.039   -1.83   *  -0.077 -1.65 *  0.053 1.11  -  0.199 4.26  ****  0.078 3.29  **** 
Emp size 500-999  -0.037   -1.67   *  -0.028 -0.57 -  0.072 1.37  +  0.205 4.03  ****  0.092 3.32  **** 
Emp size >=1000  0.036   0.79   -  -0.144 -2.21 **  -0.028 -0.43 -  0.147 2.08  **  0.190 4.46  **** 
Economic sector                           
Utilities  omitted     0.303  2.47 ***  0.321 1.84  *  0.193 0.97  -  0.141 1.97  ** 
Construction  -0.073   -3.14   ****  0.251 4.07  ****  0.037 0.59  -  -0.157 -2.64 ****  -0.011 -0.48 - 
Distribution  -0.051   -1.97   **  0.120 2.31  **  0.228 3.85  ****  -0.043 -0.81 -  -0.009 -0.45 - 
Transport  0.051   1.50   +  -0.074 -1.12 -  -0.040 -0.52 -  -0.042 -0.60 -  -0.010 -0.37 - 
Finance  -0.011   -0.20   -  0.113 1.25  -  0.228 2.10  **  0.046 0.45  -  -0.012 -0.39 - 
Business services  -0.014   -0.55   -  0.134 2.69  ****  0.120 2.07  **  -0.080 -1.63 +  -0.010 -0.54 - 
Education-Health (private)  0.436   5.57   ****  -0.368 -4.84 ****  -0.290 -3.78 ****  -0.347 -5.39 ****  -0.081 -4.16 **** 
Personal services  0.068   1.38   +  0.001 0.01  -  0.180 1.95  *  -0.133 -1.81 *  -0.033 -1.04 - 
                      
Pseudo  r2  0.371     0.1404     0.2225     0.1766     0.1222    
N  2738     2738     2742     2738     2738    
 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%; + 20%, based on robust standard errors. Significance adjusted for  
smaller GB sample: ## 5%, # 10%, + 20% (standard errors adjusted to French sample size) 
Source: REPONSE, WERS 2004. Logit coefficients presented as marginal effects. 
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Appendix Table 5. Poisson Regression on the number of incentive pay schemes reported in 
use at the establishment (non-manager schemes) 
 
  Pooled   GB   France   
  Coef.   Coef. sig  Coef. sig 
France  1.227  ****      
Training intensity  0.049  -  0.091  -  0.037   - 
OJT for skill jobs  -0.092  -  -0.161  -  -0.059   - 
% using computer  0.157  ****  0.365  *  0.127   ** 
% managers & prof  -0.067  -  -0.476  +  0.072   - 
% technicians  0.107  -  -0.425  +  0.194   ** 
Teams  -0.004  -  0.108  -  -0.032   - 
Small group activities  0.073  +  0.295  +  0.032   - 
Job rotation  -0.087  **  -0.124  -  -0.078   * 
Business targets  0.223  ****  0.158  -  0.259   **** 
Total quality workplace  0.036  -  -0.171  +  0.063   ** 
Monitor absence  0.087  ****  0.265  +  0.070   *** 
Use agency staff  0.169  ****  0.279  ****  0.153   **** 
% admin & sales  0.353  ****  0.438  **  0.253   **** 
% fix term employees  0.080  -  0.257  -  0.191   - 
% fix-term & no growth  -0.180  -  -0.099  -  -0.554   - 
% women  -0.271  ****  -0.572  **  -0.187   *** 
Job autonomy  0.569  ****  0.490  **  -0.047   - 
Job autonomy*france  -0.633  ****         
Appraisals  0.782  ****  0.652  ****  0.794   **** 
Good ER climate  0.143  *  -0.186  -  0.171   ** 
Pay above industry average  0.054  +  0.317  ****  -0.023   - 
Relative financial perf  0.089  -  0.234  -  0.073   - 
Compete on price  -0.002  -  0.013  -  0.015   - 
Compete on quality  0.066  +  0.061  -  0.086   * 
Workplace TU rep  0.022  -  -0.036  -  0.049   + 
Pay Agt coverage  -0.057  *  -0.240  -  -0.032   - 
Employer National Body Only  -0.055  +  -0.238  *  -0.023   - 
Employer local activities  -0.028  -  -0.073  -  -0.017   - 
Local activities & single est  0.135  **  0.269  -  0.137   *** 
Single establishment  -0.175  ****  -0.247  +  -0.168   **** 
Emp size 50-99  0.034  -  -0.173  +  0.062   * 
Emp size 100-199  0.035  -  -0.257  *  0.057   * 
Emp size 200-499  0.070  *  -0.099  -  0.072   ** 
Emp size 500-999  0.067  +  -0.025  -  0.055   + 
Emp size >=1000  0.042  -  0.162  -  -0.026   - 
Utilities  0.202  ****  0.107  -  0.180   **** 
Construction  0.010  -  -0.028  -  0.039   - 
Distribution  0.001  -  -0.099  -  0.050   - 
Transport  -0.164  **  -0.221  -  -0.123   + 
Finance  0.203  ****  0.595  ****  0.061   - 
Business services  0.029  -  0.207  -  0.015   - 
Education-Health (private)  -1.298  ****  -1.111  ****  -1.283   **** 
Personal services  -0.180  **  -0.442  +  -0.101   - 
Constant  -1.863  ****  -1.678  ****  -0.764   **** 
         
 3787   1151   2636  
Dependent variable: using 0-3 types of incentive pay system (NIP, IPBR, Merit Pay and Profit 
sharing) 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%; + 20%. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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